Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] X.509: support OSCCA sm2-with-sm3 certificate verification

From: Tianjia Zhang
Date: Mon Sep 14 2020 - 02:35:05 EST


Hi Gilad,

On 9/13/20 3:12 PM, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote:
Hi,


On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 4:13 PM Tianjia Zhang
<tianjia.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as
specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption
Management Bureau, China.

The method of generating Other User Information is defined as
ZA=H256(ENTLA || IDA || a || b || xG || yG || xA || yA), it also
specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.

The x509 certificate supports sm2-with-sm3 type certificate
verification. Because certificate verification requires ZA
in addition to tbs data, ZA also depends on elliptic curve
parameters and public key data, so you need to access tbs in sig
and calculate ZA. Finally calculate the digest of the
signature and complete the verification work. The calculation
process of ZA is declared in specifications GM/T 0009-2012
and GM/T 0003.2-2012.

Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_sm2.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 ++
include/crypto/public_key.h | 15 ++++++
5 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_sm2.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 28b91adba2ae..1a99ea5acb6b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := \
signature.o

obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key_sm2.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE) += asym_tpm.o

#
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index d8410ffd7f12..1d0492098bbd 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -299,6 +299,12 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;

+ if (strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) {
+ ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_free_key;
+ }
+
sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_sm2.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_sm2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7325cf21dbb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_sm2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * asymmetric public-key algorithm for SM2-with-SM3 certificate
+ * as specified by OSCCA GM/T 0003.1-2012 -- 0003.5-2012 SM2 and
+ * described at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, Alibaba Group.
+ * Authors: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/sm3_base.h>
+#include <crypto/sm2.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2)
+
+int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t desc_size;
+ unsigned char dgst[SM3_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ BUG_ON(!sig->data);
+
+ ret = sm2_compute_z_digest(tfm_pkey, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID,
+ SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN, dgst);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ goto error_free_tfm;
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_desc;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, dgst, SM3_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_desc;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sig->data, sig->data_size, sig->digest);

It looks like you are doing a separate init, update, finup every time
- I would consider using crypto_shash_digest() in one go.

In fact, considering the fact that you are allocating a tfm just for
this use and then releasing it, I would consider switching to
crypto_shash_tfm_digest() and dropping the kzalloc all together.

This should simplify the code a bit.

Other than that I don't have anything smart to say :-)

Gilad


The hash calculation here includes two parts of data, 'dgst' and 'sig->data'. The last call is 'finup()' not 'final()'. I understand that it should not be possible to use 'crypto_shash_tfm_digest()' This kind of function is simplified.

If a new scope is added, the assignment of desc can be optimized, as follows:
```
do {
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
desc->tfm = tfm;

/* ... */
} while (0);
```
However, the kernel code may not accept this style. What is your opinion?

Thanks,
Tianjia