Re: [PATCH v3] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Mon, Sep 14, 2020 at 09:23:59PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Borislav Petkov
> > Sent: 14 September 2020 18:56
> > 
> > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:22:53PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > +/*
> > > + * Sanitize a user pointer such that it becomes NULL if it's not a valid user
> > > + * pointer.  This prevents speculative dereferences of user-controlled pointers
> > > + * to kernel space when access_ok() speculatively returns true.  This should be
> > > + * done *after* access_ok(), to avoid affecting error handling behavior.
> > 
> > Err, stupid question: can this macro then be folded into access_ok() so
> > that you don't have to touch so many places and the check can happen
> > automatically?
> 
> My thoughts are that access_ok() could return 0 for fail and ~0u
> for success.
> You could then do (with a few casts):
> 	mask = access_ok(ptr, size);
> 	/* Stop gcc tracking the value of mask. */
> 	asm volatile( "" : "+r" (mask));
> 	addr = ptr & mask;
> 	if (!addr && ptr)  // Let NULL through??
> 		return -EFAULT;
> 
> I think there are other changes in the pipeline to remove
> most of the access_ok() apart from those inside put/get_user()
> and copy_to/from_user().
> So the changes should be more limited than you might think.

Maybe, but I believe that's still going to end up a treewide change.

And, if we're going to the trouble of changing the access_ok()
interface, we should change it enough to make sure that accidental uses
of the old interface (after years of muscle memory) will fail to build.

We could either add a 3rd argument, or rename it to access_ok_mask() or
something.

-- 
Josh