Re: [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance

[Torsten Duwe]

Almost two weeks passed and these are the "relevant" replies:

Jason personally does not like FIPS, and is afraid of
"subpar crypto". Albeit this patch set strictly isn't about
crypto at all; the crypto subsystem is in the unlucky position
to just depend on a good entropy source.

Greg claims that Linux (kernel) isn't about choice, which is clearly
wrong.

And this is all ???

There are options for stack protection. I can see bounds checking
and other sanity checks all over the place. And doing a similar thing
on entropy sources is a problem?

Admittedly, if entropy sources fail, the kernel will happily remain
running. No bad immediate effects in userland will arise. Only some
cryptographic algorithms, otherwise very decent, will run on
unneccessarily weak keys, probably causing some real-world problems.
Does anybody care?
The NIST and the BSI do, but that does not mean their solutions are
automatically wrong or backdoored.

There is now a well layed-out scheme to ensure quality randomness,
and a lot of work here has been put into its implementation.

Would some maintainer please comment on potential problems or
shortcomings? Otherwise a "Thanks, applied" would be appropriate, IMO.

	Torsten