[PATCH 4.9 17/54] net/packet: fix overflow in tpacket_rcv

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon Oct 12 2020 - 09:35:25 EST


From: Or Cohen <orcohen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit acf69c946233259ab4d64f8869d4037a198c7f06 upstream.

Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.

This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po->has_vnet_hdr
is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.

The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.

This addresses CVE-2020-14386

Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[ snu: backported to pre-5.3, changed tp_drops counting/locking ]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Nuernberger <snu@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Amit Shah <aams@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2161,7 +2161,8 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
- unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
+ unsigned short macoff, hdrlen;
+ unsigned int netoff;
struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
struct timespec ts;
__u32 ts_status;
@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
}
macoff = netoff - maclen;
}
+ if (netoff > USHRT_MAX) {
+ spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+ po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
+ spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+ goto drop_n_restore;
+ }
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
if (po->copy_thresh &&