Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm/mprotect: Call arch_validate_prot under mmap_lock and with length

[Khalid Aziz]

On 10/13/20 3:16 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 01:14:50PM -0600, Khalid Aziz wrote:
>> On 10/12/20 11:22 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
>>> On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 11:03:33AM -0600, Khalid Aziz wrote:
>>>> On 10/10/20 5:09 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 02:14:09PM -0600, Khalid Aziz wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/7/20 1:39 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>>>>>> arch_validate_prot() is a hook that can validate whether a given set of
>>>>>>> protection flags is valid in an mprotect() operation. It is given the set
>>>>>>> of protection flags and the address being modified.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However, the address being modified can currently not actually be used in
>>>>>>> a meaningful way because:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Only the address is given, but not the length, and the operation can
>>>>>>>    span multiple VMAs. Therefore, the callee can't actually tell which
>>>>>>>    virtual address range, or which VMAs, are being targeted.
>>>>>>> 2. The mmap_lock is not held, meaning that if the callee were to check
>>>>>>>    the VMA at @addr, that VMA would be unrelated to the one the
>>>>>>>    operation is performed on.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Currently, custom arch_validate_prot() handlers are defined by
>>>>>>> arm64, powerpc and sparc.
>>>>>>> arm64 and powerpc don't care about the address range, they just check the
>>>>>>> flags against CPU support masks.
>>>>>>> sparc's arch_validate_prot() attempts to look at the VMA, but doesn't take
>>>>>>> the mmap_lock.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Change the function signature to also take a length, and move the
>>>>>>> arch_validate_prot() call in mm/mprotect.c down into the locked region.
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>> As Chris pointed out, the call to arch_validate_prot() from do_mmap2()
>>>>>> is made without holding mmap_lock. Lock is not acquired until
>>>>>> vm_mmap_pgoff(). This variance is uncomfortable but I am more
>>>>>> uncomfortable forcing all implementations of validate_prot to require
>>>>>> mmap_lock be held when non-sparc implementations do not have such need
>>>>>> yet. Since do_mmap2() is in powerpc specific code, for now this patch
>>>>>> solves a current problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> I still think sparc should avoid walking the vmas in
>>>>> arch_validate_prot(). The core code already has the vmas, though not
>>>>> when calling arch_validate_prot(). That's one of the reasons I added
>>>>> arch_validate_flags() with the MTE patches. For sparc, this could be
>>>>> (untested, just copied the arch_validate_prot() code):
>>>>
>>>> I am little uncomfortable with the idea of validating protection bits
>>>> inside the VMA walk loop in do_mprotect_pkey(). When ADI is being
>>>> enabled across multiple VMAs and arch_validate_flags() fails on a VMA
>>>> later, do_mprotect_pkey() will bail out with error leaving ADI enabled
>>>> on earlier VMAs. This will apply to protection bits other than ADI as
>>>> well of course. This becomes a partial failure of mprotect() call. I
>>>> think it should be all or nothing with mprotect() - when one calls
>>>> mprotect() from userspace, either the entire address range passed in
>>>> gets its protection bits updated or none of it does. That requires
>>>> validating protection bits upfront or undoing what earlier iterations of
>>>> VMA walk loop might have done.
>>>
>>> I thought the same initially but mprotect() already does this with the
>>> VM_MAY* flag checking. If you ask it for an mprotect() that crosses
>>> multiple vmas and one of them fails, it doesn't roll back the changes to
>>> the prior ones. I considered that a similar approach is fine for MTE
>>> (it's most likely a user error).
>>
>> You are right about the current behavior with VM_MAY* flags, but that is
>> not the right behavior. Adding more cases to this just perpetuates
>> incorrect behavior. It is not easy to roll back changes after VMAs have
>> potentially been split/merged which is probably why the current code
>> simply throws in the towel and returns with partially modified address
>> space. It is lot easier to do all the checks upfront and then proceed or
>> not proceed with modifying VMAs. One approach might be to call
>> arch_validate_flags() in a loop before modifying VMAs and walk all VMAs
>> with a read lock held. Current code also bails out with ENOMEM if it
>> finds a hole in the address range and leaves any modifications already
>> made in place. This is another case where a hole could have been
>> detected earlier.
> 
> This should be ideal indeed though with the risk of breaking the current
> ABI (FWIW, FreeBSD seems to do a first pass to check for violations:
> https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/blob/master/sys/vm/vm_map.c#L2630).

I am not sure I understand where the ABI breakage would be. Are we aware
of apps that intentionally modify address space partially using the
current code? What FreeBSD does seems like a reasonable thing to do. Any
way first thing to do is to update sparc to use arch_validate_flags()
and update sparc_validate_prot() to not peek into vma without lock. I
can do that unless Jann wants to rework this 2 patch series with these
changes.

> 
> However, I'm not sure it's worth the hassle. Do we expect the user to
> call mprotect() across multiple mixed type mappings while relying on no
> change if an error is returned? We should probably at least document the
> current behaviour in the mprotect man page.
> 

Yes, documenting current behavior is definitely a good thing to do.

--
Khalid