[PATCH 5.4 09/13] perf: Break deadlock involving exec_update_mutex

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit 78af4dc949daaa37b3fcd5f348f373085b4e858f ]

Syzbot reported a lock inversion involving perf. The sore point being
perf holding exec_update_mutex() for a very long time, specifically
across a whole bunch of filesystem ops in pmu::event_init() (uprobes)
and anon_inode_getfile().

This then inverts against procfs code trying to take
exec_update_mutex.

Move the permission checks later, such that we need to hold the mutex
over less code.

Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 9f7c2da992991..18dbdf248ed81 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11001,24 +11001,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		goto err_task;
 	}
 
-	if (task) {
-		err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
-		if (err)
-			goto err_task;
-
-		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
-		 *
-		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
-		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
-		 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
-		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
-		 */
-		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
-			goto err_cred;
-	}
-
 	if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
 		cgroup_fd = pid;
 
@@ -11026,7 +11008,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 				 NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
 	if (IS_ERR(event)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(event);
-		goto err_cred;
+		goto err_task;
 	}
 
 	if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
@@ -11145,6 +11127,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		goto err_context;
 	}
 
+	if (task) {
+		err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
+		if (err)
+			goto err_file;
+
+		/*
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
+		 *
+		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
+		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
+		 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
+		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
+		 */
+		err = -EACCES;
+		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+			goto err_cred;
+	}
+
 	if (move_group) {
 		gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx);
 
@@ -11320,7 +11320,10 @@ err_locked:
 	if (move_group)
 		perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
-/* err_file: */
+err_cred:
+	if (task)
+		mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
+err_file:
 	fput(event_file);
 err_context:
 	perf_unpin_context(ctx);
@@ -11332,9 +11335,6 @@ err_alloc:
 	 */
 	if (!event_file)
 		free_event(event);
-err_cred:
-	if (task)
-		mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
 err_task:
 	if (task)
 		put_task_struct(task);
-- 
2.27.0