Re: [PATCH v13 3/4] selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes

[Lokesh Gidra]

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 2:30 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 10:55 PM Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 7:03 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 8:54 PM Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > >
> > > > This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
> > > > the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control
> > > > anonymous-inode files that are created using the new
> > > > anon_inode_getfd_secure() function.
> > > >
> > > > A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
> > > > adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
> > > > type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
> > > > for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
> > > > anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
> > > > "[perf_event]".
> > > >
> > > > Example:
> > > >
> > > > type uffd_t;
> > > > type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
> > > > allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
> > > >
> > > > (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
> > > > support this new interface.  The example above is just
> > > > for exposition.)
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > ---
> > > >  security/selinux/hooks.c            | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > >  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 ++
> > > >  2 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > index 6b1826fc3658..d092aa512868 100644
> > > > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > @@ -2927,6 +2927,61 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> > > >         return 0;
> > > >  }
> > > >
> > > > +static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
> > > > +                                           const struct qstr *name,
> > > > +                                           const struct inode *context_inode)
> > > > +{
> > > > +       const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
> > > > +       struct common_audit_data ad;
> > > > +       struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> > > > +       int rc;
> > > > +
> > > > +       if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
> > > > +               return 0;
> > > > +
> > > > +       isec = selinux_inode(inode);
> > > > +
> > > > +       /*
> > > > +        * We only get here once per ephemeral inode.  The inode has
> > > > +        * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
> > > > +        * untouched.
> > > > +        */
> > > > +
> > > > +       if (context_inode) {
> > > > +               struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
> > > > +                       selinux_inode(context_inode);
> > > > +               if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)
> > > > +                       return -EACCES;
> > > > +
> > > > +               isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
> > >
> > > Taking the object class directly from the context_inode is
> > > interesting, and I suspect problematic.  In the case below where no
> > > context_inode is supplied the object class is set to
> > > SECCLASS_ANON_INODE, which is correct, but when a context_inode is
> > > supplied there is no guarantee that the object class will be set to
> > > SECCLASS_ANON_INODE.  This could both pose a problem for policy
> > > writers (how do you distinguish the anon inode from other normal file
> > > inodes in this case?) as well as an outright fault later in this
> > > function when we try to check the ANON_INODE__CREATE on an object
> > > other than a SECCLASS_ANON_INODE object.
> > >
> > Thanks for catching this. I'll initialize 'sclass' unconditionally to
> > SECCLASS_ANON_INODE in the next version. Also, do you think I should
> > add a check that context_inode's sclass must be SECCLASS_ANON_INODE to
> > confirm that we never receive a regular inode as context_inode?
>
> This is one of the reasons why I was asking if you ever saw the need
> to use a regular inode here.  It seems much safer to me to add a check
> to ensure that context_inode is SECCLASS_ANON_INODE and return an
> error otherwise; I would also suggest emitting an error using pr_err()
> with something along the lines of "SELinux:  initializing anonymous
> inode with inappropriate inode" (or something similar).
>
Thanks. I'll do that.

> If something changes in the future we can always reconsider this restriction.
>
> > > It works in the userfaultfd case because the context_inode is
> > > originally created with this function so the object class is correctly
> > > set to SECCLASS_ANON_INODE, but can we always guarantee that to be the
> > > case?  Do we ever need or want to support using a context_inode that
> > > is not SECCLASS_ANON_INODE?
> >
> > I don't think there is any requirement of supporting context_inode
> > which isn't anon-inode. And even if there is, as you described
> > earlier, for ANON_INODE__CREATE to work the sclass has to be
> > SECCLASS_ANON_INODE. I'll appreciate comments on this from others,
> > particularly Daniel and Stephen who originally discussed and
> > implemented this patch.
>
> I would encourage you not to wait too long for additional feedback
> before sending the next revision.

Certainly. I'll send next version in a day or two.
>
> --
> paul moore
> www.paul-moore.com