Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if tsx=off
From: Sean Christopherson
Date: Thu Jan 28 2021 - 12:59:06 EST
On Thu, Jan 28, 2021, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Userspace that does not know about KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST will
> generally use the default value for MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
> When this happens and the host has tsx=on, it is possible to end up
> with virtual machines that have HLE and RTM disabled, but TSX_CTRL
> disabled.
Thos wording is confusing the heck out of me. I think what you're saying is
"but TSX disabled in the guest via TSX_CTRL". I read "but TSX_CTRL disabled" as
saying the the TSX_CTRL itself was disabled/unsupported.
> If the fleet is then switched to tsx=off, kvm_get_arch_capabilities()
> will clear the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit and it will not be possible
> to use the tsx=off as migration destinations, even though the guests
> indeed do not have TSX enabled.
>
> When tsx=off is used, however, we know that guests will not have
> HLE and RTM (or if userspace sets bogus CPUID data, we do not
> expect HLE and RTM to work in guests). Therefore we can keep
> TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE set for the entire life of the guests and
> save MSR reads and writes on KVM_RUN and in the user return
> notifiers.
>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Fixes: cbbaa2727aa3 ("KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES")
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index cc60b1fc3ee7..80491a729408 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6863,8 +6863,18 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so
> * let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host
> * kernel's feet.
> + *
> + * If the host disabled RTM, we may still need TSX_CTRL
> + * to be supported in the guest; for example the guest
> + * could have been created on a tsx=on host with hle=0,
> + * rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 and later migrate to a tsx=off host.
> + * In that case however do not change the value on the host,
> + * so that TSX remains always disabled.
Oof, can you reword this to clarify what "the value" refers to? The previous
paragraphs talks about TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR, and the obvious "value" in the code
is also TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR, and so I thought the comment was saying "don't
change the value of CPUID_CLEAR", which is non-sensical because that's the the
RTM-enabled case does...
> */
> - vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
> + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
> + else
> + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = 0;
IMO, this is an unnecessarily confusing way to "remove" the user return MSR.
Changing the ordering to do a 'continue' would also provide a separate chunk of
code for the new comment. And maybe replace the switch with an if-statement to
avoid a 'continue' buried in a switch?
vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].slot = i;
vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].data = 0;
if (index == MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) {
/* Fancy new comment here. */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
continue;
/*
* No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so
* let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host
* kernel's feet.
*/
vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
} else {
vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = -1ull;
}
> break;
> default:
> vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = -1ull;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 76bce832cade..15733013b266 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
This comments needs to be rewritten, it reflects the old behavior of exposing
the feature iff RTM/TSC is supported by the host.
> * This lets the guest use VERW to clear CPU buffers.
> */
> if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
> - data &= ~(ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
> + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
> else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
> data |= ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
>
> --
> 2.26.2
>