Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states

[Dave Hansen]

On 2/1/21 2:43 PM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> On 1/29/2021 2:53 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 1/29/21 2:35 PM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
>>>> Andy Cooper just mentioned on IRC about this nugget in the spec:
>>>>
>>>>      XRSTORS on CET state will do reserved bit and canonicality
>>>>      checks on the state in similar manner as done by the WRMSR to
>>>>      these state elements.
>>>>
>>>> We're using copy_kernel_to_xregs_err(), so the #GP *should* be OK.
>>>> Could we prove this out in practice, please?
>>>>>
>>> Do we want to verify that setting reserved bits in CET XSAVES states
>>> triggers GP?  Then, yes, I just verified it again.  Thanks for
>>> reminding.  Do we have any particular case relating to this?
>>
>> I want to confirm that it triggers #GP and kills userspace without the
>> kernel WARN'ing or otherwise being visibly unhappy.
> 
> For sigreturn, shadow stack pointer is checked against its restore token
> and must be smaller than TASK_SIZE_MAX.  Sigreturn cannot set any
> MSR_IA32_U_CET reserved bits.

That would be nice to at least allude to in the changelog or comments.

>> What about the return-to-userspace path after a ptracer writes content
>> to the CET fields?   I don't see the same tolerance for errors in
>> __fpregs_load_activate(), for instance.
>>
> 
> Good thought.  I have not sent out my revised PTRACE patch, but values
> from user will be checked for valid address and reserved bits.

Wait a sec...  What about *THIS* series?  Will *THIS* series give us
oopses when userspace blasts a new XSAVE buffer in with NT_X86_XSTATE?