Re: [PATCH v2] IMA: support for duplicate data measurement

[Tushar Sugandhi]

Hi Mimi,

On 2021-02-17 12:49 p.m., Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> On 2021-02-17 12:39 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2021-02-17 at 10:53 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> > > Thanks for the feedback Mimi.
> > > Appreciate it.
> > >
> > > On 2021-02-17 7:03 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > Hi Tushar,
> > > >
> > > > The Subject line could be improved.  Perhaps something like - "IMA:
> > > > support for duplicate measurement records"
> > > Will do.
> > >
> > > > On Tue, 2021-02-16 at 18:46 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> > > > > IMA does not measure duplicate data since TPM extend is a very 
> > > > > expensive
> > > > > operation.  However, in some cases, the measurement of duplicate data
> > > > > is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system.
> > > > > Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to
> > > > > 'audit' again.  In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the
> > > > > last state change to 'audit'.  This limits the ability of attestation
> > > > > services to accurately determine the current state of the measurements
> > > > > on the system.
> > > >
> > > > This patch description is written from your specific usecase
> > > > perspective, but it impacts file and buffer data measurements as well,
> > > > not only critical data measurements.  In all of these situations, with
> > > > this patch a new measurement record is added/appended to the
> > > > measurement list.  Please re-write the patch description making it more
> > > > generic.
> > > >
> > > > For example, I would start with something like, "IMA does not include
> > > > duplicate file, buffer or critical data measurement records ..."
> > > Agreed.
> > > I will generalize the description further and send the v3 for review.
> >
> > It would be good to boot with the ima_policy=tcb policy with/without
> > your patch and account for the different number of measurements.   Are
> > all the differences related to duplicate measurements - original file
> > hash -> new file hash -> original file hash - similar to what you
> > described.
> Thanks for the ima_policy=tcb pointer.
>
> I tested my patch with:
>   - duplicate buffer content for "measure func=CRITICAL_DATA"
>   - and reading the same file twice with "measure func=FILE_CHECK 
> mask=MAY_READ"
>
> In both the above use cases, IMA is measuring the duplicate entries with 
> the patch, and not measuring the duplicate entries w/o the patch.
>
> I will test the "ima_policy=tcb" boot-scenario as you suggested, before 
> posting the next version.

I booted the system with "ima_policy=tcb" policy with/without my patch.
I also removed /etc/ima/ima-policy for testing these use-cases.
(so that it wouldn't override the policy generated by boot param 
"ima_policy=tcb").

I double checked the contents of the kernel policy:
#cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
    dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x43415d53
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x63677270
    dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
    dont_measure fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
    measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
    measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
    measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ euid=0
    measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ uid=0
    measure func=MODULE_CHECK
    measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
    measure func=POLICY_CHECK

And then I compared the contents of the ascii_runtime_measurements with 
and without my patch.

And here are my findings:

(1) Files like systemd-udevd, x2go_sessions etc. get measured multiple
    times with the CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE=y.
    They only get measured once with the config "=n".

    10 668df8723f5a1f57a0afe3b50d44054d66363f3e ima-ng 
sha1:51f66e82421b93b21ad1e0a25e5efa4155c6a8e0 /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
    10 668df8723f5a1f57a0afe3b50d44054d66363f3e ima-ng 
sha1:51f66e82421b93b21ad1e0a25e5efa4155c6a8e0 /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd

(2) There are lot more instances of /tmp/<random> measurement records
    with the CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE=y.
    Eg,

    10 33515851cfee4acbf24de9482ff018d33def1083 ima-ng 
sha1:da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 /tmp/oUWCVeypLR
    10 9d1dc0e1e54ee2e16308a824fc5780bd21b38208 ima-ng 
sha1:da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 /tmp/etX8dy7qqy
    10 8643a5543179b86c02d7e3e01e16b3bd2f8dbb9f ima-ng 
sha1:da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 /tmp/I4zTWEuyMf
    10 56e9547a4ed39036d2e790cfad78b467aa979e32 ima-ng 
sha1:da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 /tmp/Lh5wDm6_Ep

I believe both the observations are consistent with the expected outcome 
of the patch.

Please let me know if I should test any other scenario.

I will shortly post the v3 patch with updates to description and title 
as you suggested.

Thanks,
Tushar

> Thanks,
> Tushar
>
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi