[PATCH] security: keys: trusted: prevent memory leak in error path
From: Muhammad Usama Anjum
Date: Tue Apr 13 2021 - 16:13:42 EST
tpm2_key_decode sometimes allocates blob. This blob should be freed if
some error occurs later in the function. Free the blob before returning
from this function if it was allocated.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Prevent memory leak")
Fixes: 14676f1eb796 ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <musamaanjum@xxxxxxxxx>
---
This is only build tested.
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 37 +++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index d225ad140960..4551384124e0 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -378,22 +378,30 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
- if (!options->keyhandle)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!options->keyhandle) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
- if (payload->blob_len < 4)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (payload->blob_len < 4) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
/* must be big enough for following public_len */
- if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
- return -E2BIG;
+ if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) {
+ rc = -E2BIG;
+ goto err;
+ }
public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
- if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
- return -E2BIG;
+ if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) {
+ rc = -E2BIG;
+ goto err;
+ }
pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
/* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
@@ -406,12 +414,14 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
payload->migratable = 1;
blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
- if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
- return -E2BIG;
+ if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) {
+ rc = -E2BIG;
+ goto err;
+ }
rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto err;
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
@@ -433,12 +443,13 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
- if (blob != payload->blob)
- kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
+err:
+ if (blob != payload->blob)
+ kfree(blob);
return rc;
}
--
2.25.1