Re: [External] Re: [PATCH] tcp: fix silent loss when syncookie is trigered

[Eric Dumazet]

On Sat, Apr 17, 2021 at 12:45 AM 赵亚 <zhaoya.gaius@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 7:52 PM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 12:52 PM zhaoya <zhaoya.gaius@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > When syncookie is triggered, since $MSSID is spliced into cookie and
> > > the legal index of msstab  is 0,1,2,3, this gives client 3 bytes
> > > of freedom, resulting in at most 3 bytes of silent loss.
> > >
> > > C ------------seq=12345-------------> S
> > > C <------seq=cookie/ack=12346-------- S S generated the cookie
> > >                                         [RFC4987 Appendix A]
> > > C ---seq=123456/ack=cookie+1-->X      S The first byte was loss.
> > > C -----seq=123457/ack=cookie+1------> S The second byte was received and
> > >                                         cookie-check was still okay and
> > >                                         handshake was finished.
> > > C <--------seq=.../ack=12348--------- S acknowledge the second byte.
> >
> >
> > I think this has been discussed in the past :
> > https://kognitio.com/blog/syn-cookies-ate-my-dog-breaking-tcp-on-linux/
> >
> > If I remember well, this can not be fixed "easily"
> >
> > I suspect you are trading one minor issue with another (which is
> > considered more practical these days)
> > Have you tried what happens if the server receives an out-of-order
> > packet after the SYN & SYN-ACK ?
> > The answer is : RST packet is sent, killing the session.
> >
> > That is the reason why sseq is not part of the hash key.
>
> Yes, I've tested this scenario. More sessions do get reset.
>
> If a client got an RST, it knew the session failed, which was clear. However,
> if the client send a character and it was acknowledged, but the server did not
> receive it, this could cause confusion.
> >
> > In practice, secure connexions are using a setup phase where more than
> > 3 bytes are sent in the first packet.
> > We recommend using secure protocols over TCP. (prefer HTTPS over HTTP,
> > SSL over plaintext)
>
> Yes, i agree with you. But the basis of practice is principle.
> Syncookie breaks the
> semantics of TCP.
> >
> > Your change would severely impair servers under DDOS ability to really
> > establish flows.
>
> Would you tell me more details.
> >
> > Now, if your patch is protected by a sysctl so that admins can choose
> > the preferred behavior, then why not...
>
> The sysctl in the POC is just for triggering problems easily.
>
> So the question is, when syncookie is triggered, which is more important,
> the practice or the principle?

SYNCOOKIES have lots of known limitations.

You can disable them if you need.

Or you can add a sysctl or socket options so that each listener can
decide what they want.

I gave feedback of why your initial patch was _not_ good.

I think it can render a server under DDOS absolutely unusable.
Exactly the same situation than _without_ syncookies being used.
We do not want to go back to the situation wed had before SYNCOOKIES
were invented.

I think you should have put a big warning in the changelog to explain
that you fully understood
the risks.

We prefer having servers that can still be useful, especially ones
serving 100% HTTPS traffic.

Thank you.