Re: [RFCv2 13/13] KVM: unmap guest memory using poisoned pages

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 06:09:29PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > But fundamentally the private pages, are well, private.  They can't be shared
> > > across processes, so I think we could (should?) require the VMA to always be
> > > MAP_PRIVATE.  Does that buy us enough to rely on the VMA alone?  I.e. is that
> > > enough to prevent userspace and unaware kernel code from acquiring a reference
> > > to the underlying page?
> > 
> > Shared pages should be fine too (you folks wanted tmpfs support).
> 
> Is that a conflict though?  If the private->shared conversion request is kicked
> out to userspace, then userspace can re-mmap() the files as MAP_SHARED, no?
> 
> Allowing MAP_SHARED for guest private memory feels wrong.  The data can't be
> shared, and dirty data can't be written back to the file.

It can be remapped, but faulting in the page would produce hwpoison entry.
I don't see other way to make Google's use-case with tmpfs-backed guest
memory work.

> > The poisoned pages must be useless outside of the process with the blessed
> > struct kvm. See kvm_pfn_map in the patch.
> 
> The big requirement for kernel TDX support is that the pages are useless in the
> host.  Regarding the guest, for TDX, the TDX Module guarantees that at most a
> single KVM guest can have access to a page at any given time.  I believe the RMP
> provides the same guarantees for SEV-SNP.
> 
> SEV/SEV-ES could still end up with corruption if multiple guests map the same
> private page, but that's obviously not the end of the world since it's the status
> quo today.  Living with that shortcoming might be a worthy tradeoff if punting
> mutual exclusion between guests to firmware/hardware allows us to simplify the
> kernel implementation.

The critical question is whether we ever need to translate hva->pfn after
the page is added to the guest private memory. I believe we do, but I
never checked. And that's the reason we need to keep hwpoison entries
around, which encode pfn.

If we don't, it would simplify the solution: kvm_pfn_map is not needed.
Single bit-per page would be enough.

> > > >  - Add a new GUP flag to retrive such pages from the userspace mapping.
> > > >    Used only for private mapping population.
> > > 
> > > >  - Shared gfn ranges managed by userspace, based on hypercalls from the
> > > >    guest.
> > > > 
> > > >  - Shared mappings get populated via normal VMA. Any poisoned pages here
> > > >    would lead to SIGBUS.
> > > > 
> > > > So far it looks pretty straight-forward.
> > > > 
> > > > The only thing that I don't understand is at way point the page gets tied
> > > > to the KVM instance. Currently we do it just before populating shadow
> > > > entries, but it would not work with the new scheme: as we poison pages
> > > > on fault it they may never get inserted into shadow entries. That's not
> > > > good as we rely on the info to unpoison page on free.
> > > 
> > > Can you elaborate on what you mean by "unpoison"?  If the page is never actually
> > > mapped into the guest, then its poisoned status is nothing more than a software
> > > flag, i.e. nothing extra needs to be done on free.
> > 
> > Normally, poisoned flag preserved for freed pages as it usually indicate
> > hardware issue. In this case we need return page to the normal circulation.
> > So we need a way to differentiate two kinds of page poison. Current patch
> > does this by adding page's pfn to kvm_pfn_map. But this will not work if
> > we uncouple poisoning and adding to shadow PTE.
> 
> Why use PG_hwpoison then?

Page flags are scarce. I don't want to take occupy a new one until I'm
sure I must.

And we can re-use existing infrastructure to SIGBUS on access to such
pages.

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov