Re: [PATCH v11 1/6] arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE is untagged

From: Steven Price
Date: Thu Apr 29 2021 - 12:06:19 EST


On 27/04/2021 18:43, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 04:43:04PM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
A KVM guest could store tags in a page even if the VMM hasn't mapped
the page with PROT_MTE. So when restoring pages from swap we will
need to check to see if there are any saved tags even if !pte_tagged().

However don't check pages which are !pte_valid_user() as these will
not have been swapped out.

You should remove the pte_valid_user() mention from the commit log as
well.

Good spot - sorry about that. I really must get better at reading my own commit messages.

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e17b96d0e4b5..cf4b52a33b3c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
__sync_icache_dcache(pte);
if (system_supports_mte() &&
- pte_present(pte) && pte_tagged(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
+ pte_present(pte) && (pte_val(pte) & PTE_USER) && !pte_special(pte))

I would add a pte_user() macro here or, if we restore the tags only when
the page is readable, use pte_access_permitted(pte, false). Also add a
comment why we do this.

pte_access_permitted() looks like it describes what we want (user space can access the memory). I'll add the following comment:

/*
* If the PTE would provide user space will access to the tags
* associated with it then ensure that the MTE tags are synchronised.
* Exec-only mappings don't expose tags (instruction fetches don't
* check tags).
*/

There's also the pte_user_exec() case which may not have the PTE_USER
set (exec-only permission) but I don't think it matters. We don't do tag
checking on instruction fetches, so if the user adds a PROT_READ to it,
it would go through set_pte_at() again. I'm not sure KVM does anything
special with exec-only mappings at stage 2, I suspect they won't be
accessible by the guest (but needs checking).

It comes down to the behaviour of get_user_pages(). AFAICT that will fail if the memory is exec-only, so no stage 2 mapping will be created. Which of course means the guest can't do anything with that memory. That certainly seems like the only sane behaviour even without MTE.

mte_sync_tags(ptep, pte);
__check_racy_pte_update(mm, ptep, pte);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
index b3c70a612c7a..e016ab57ea36 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
@@ -26,17 +26,23 @@ u64 gcr_kernel_excl __ro_after_init;
static bool report_fault_once = true;
-static void mte_sync_page_tags(struct page *page, pte_t *ptep, bool check_swap)
+static void mte_sync_page_tags(struct page *page, pte_t *ptep, bool check_swap,
+ bool pte_is_tagged)
{
pte_t old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
if (check_swap && is_swap_pte(old_pte)) {
swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(old_pte);
- if (!non_swap_entry(entry) && mte_restore_tags(entry, page))
+ if (!non_swap_entry(entry) && mte_restore_tags(entry, page)) {
+ set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags);
return;
+ }
}
+ if (!pte_is_tagged || test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags))
+ return;

I don't think we need another test_bit() here, it was done in the
caller (bar potential races which need more thought).

Good point - I'll change that to a straight set_bit().

+
page_kasan_tag_reset(page);
/*
* We need smp_wmb() in between setting the flags and clearing the
@@ -54,11 +60,13 @@ void mte_sync_tags(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
struct page *page = pte_page(pte);
long i, nr_pages = compound_nr(page);
bool check_swap = nr_pages == 1;
+ bool pte_is_tagged = pte_tagged(pte);
/* if PG_mte_tagged is set, tags have already been initialised */
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++) {
- if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags))
- mte_sync_page_tags(page, ptep, check_swap);
+ if (!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags))
+ mte_sync_page_tags(page, ptep, check_swap,
+ pte_is_tagged);
}
}

You were right in the previous thread that if we have a race, it's
already there even without your patches KVM patches.

If it's the same pte in a multithreaded app, we should be ok as the core
code holds the ptl (the arch code also holds the mmap_lock during
exception handling but only as a reader, so you can have multiple
holders).

If there are multiple ptes to the same page, for example mapped with
MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_SHARED, metadata recovery is done via
arch_swap_restore() before we even set the pte and with the page locked.
So calling lock_page() again in mte_restore_tags() would deadlock.

I can see that do_swap_page() also holds the page lock around
set_pte_at(), so I think we are covered.

Any other scenario I may have missed? My understanding is that if the
pte is the same, we have the ptl. Otherwise we have the page lock for
shared pages.

That is my understanding - either the PTL is held or the page is locked. But I am aware I was partly basing that on an assumption that the existing code is correct. If there's a way that a new PTE can be created which races with the arch_swap_restore() path then there is a problem. I'm not aware of how that would happen though.

Steve