[PATCH v2] debugfs: fix security_locked_down() call for SELinux

[Ondrej Mosnacek]

When (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) is zero, then
the SELinux implementation of the locked_down hook might report a denial
even though the operation would actually be allowed.

To fix this, make sure that security_locked_down() is called only when
the return value will be taken into account (i.e. when changing one of
the problematic attributes).

Note: this was introduced by commit 5496197f9b08 ("debugfs: Restrict
debugfs when the kernel is locked down"), but it didn't matter at that
time, as the SELinux support came in later.

Fixes: 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

v2: try to explain the problem better in the description

 fs/debugfs/inode.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
index 22e86ae4dd5a..bbfc7898c1aa 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ static unsigned int debugfs_allow = DEFAULT_DEBUGFS_ALLOW_BITS;
 static int debugfs_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
 {
-	int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS);
+	int ret;
 
-	if (ret && (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
-		return ret;
+	if (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) {
+		ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 	return simple_setattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, ia);
 }
 
-- 
2.31.1