[PATCH bpf v2] bpf: check BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO when upgrading mss in 6 to 4

From: Dongseok Yi
Date: Tue May 11 2021 - 02:51:04 EST


In the forwarding path GRO -> BPF 6 to 4 -> GSO for TCP traffic, the
coalesced packet payload can be > MSS, but < MSS + 20.
bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4 will increase the MSS and it can be > the payload
length. After then tcp_gso_segment checks for the payload length if it
is <= MSS. The condition is causing the packet to be dropped.

tcp_gso_segment():
[...]
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
[...]

Allow to increase MSS when BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO is not set.

Fixes: 6578171a7ff0 (bpf: add bpf_skb_change_proto helper)
Signed-off-by: Dongseok Yi <dseok.yi@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/core/filter.c | 13 +++++++------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

v2:
per Willem de Bruijn request,
checked the flag instead of a generic approach.

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index cae56d0..a98b28d 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -3276,7 +3276,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}

-static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb, u64 flags)
{
const u32 len_diff = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(struct iphdr);
u32 off = skb_mac_header_len(skb);
@@ -3305,7 +3305,8 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb)
}

/* Due to IPv4 header, MSS can be upgraded. */
- skb_increase_gso_size(shinfo, len_diff);
+ if (!(flags & BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO))
+ skb_increase_gso_size(shinfo, len_diff);
/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs recomputed. */
shinfo->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
shinfo->gso_segs = 0;
@@ -3317,7 +3318,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}

-static int bpf_skb_proto_xlat(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 to_proto)
+static int bpf_skb_proto_xlat(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 to_proto, u64 flags)
{
__be16 from_proto = skb->protocol;

@@ -3327,7 +3328,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_xlat(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 to_proto)

if (from_proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) &&
to_proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
- return bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(skb);
+ return bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(skb, flags);

return -ENOTSUPP;
}
@@ -3337,7 +3338,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_skb_change_proto, struct sk_buff *, skb, __be16, proto,
{
int ret;

- if (unlikely(flags))
+ if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO)))
return -EINVAL;

/* General idea is that this helper does the basic groundwork
@@ -3357,7 +3358,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_skb_change_proto, struct sk_buff *, skb, __be16, proto,
* that. For offloads, we mark packet as dodgy, so that headers
* need to be verified first.
*/
- ret = bpf_skb_proto_xlat(skb, proto);
+ ret = bpf_skb_proto_xlat(skb, proto, flags);
bpf_compute_data_pointers(skb);
return ret;
}
--
2.7.4