[syzbot] KASAN: use-after-free Read in dump_schedule (2)
From: syzbot
Date: Mon May 24 2021 - 05:12:32 EST
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: f5120f59 dpaa2-eth: don't print error from dpaa2_mac_conne..
git tree: net-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1582989dd00000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=7b1a53f9a0b5a801
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a6e609c672ce997c14a8
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=11924417d00000
The issue was bisected to:
commit 7b9eba7ba0c1b24df42b70b62d154b284befbccf
Author: Leandro Dorileo <leandro.maciel.dorileo@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon Apr 8 17:12:17 2019 +0000
net/sched: taprio: fix picos_per_byte miscalculation
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1261f09dd00000
final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=1161f09dd00000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1661f09dd00000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+a6e609c672ce997c14a8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: 7b9eba7ba0c1 ("net/sched: taprio: fix picos_per_byte miscalculation")
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dump_schedule+0x758/0x7d0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1837
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888043cca140 by task syz-executor.5/9214
CPU: 1 PID: 9214 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.12.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:233
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:436
dump_schedule+0x758/0x7d0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1837
taprio_dump+0x591/0xd80 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1906
tc_fill_qdisc+0x60e/0x12a0 net/sched/sch_api.c:917
qdisc_notify.isra.0+0x2b1/0x310 net/sched/sch_api.c:984
tc_modify_qdisc+0xf54/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1636
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5550
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665d9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fba2214b188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf80 RCX: 00000000004665d9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000004bfcb9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf80
R13: 00007ffcc845827f R14: 00007fba2214b300 R15: 0000000000022000
Allocated by task 9193:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:428 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:507 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:466 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:516
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline]
taprio_change+0x5fb/0x4030 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1477
qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline]
tc_modify_qdisc+0xd50/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5550
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 9201:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:46
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:357
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:360 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:325 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:368
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:212 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1581 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xdf/0x240 mm/slub.c:1606
slab_free mm/slub.c:3166 [inline]
kfree+0xe5/0x7f0 mm/slub.c:4225
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2558 [inline]
rcu_core+0x7ab/0x13b0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2793
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9f6 kernel/softirq.c:559
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe5/0x110 mm/kasan/generic.c:345
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3038 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x750 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3113
taprio_change+0x2e82/0x4030 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1595
qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline]
tc_modify_qdisc+0xd50/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5550
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Second to last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe5/0x110 mm/kasan/generic.c:345
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3038 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x750 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3113
taprio_change+0x2e82/0x4030 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1595
qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline]
tc_modify_qdisc+0xd50/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5550
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888043cca100
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of
96-byte region [ffff888043cca100, ffff888043cca160)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00010f3280 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x43cca
flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000000200 ffffea0000886b00 0000001600000016 ffff888011041780
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 8489, ts 1045116260415, free_ts 0
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2358 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x1033/0x2b60 mm/page_alloc.c:3994
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5200
alloc_pages+0x18c/0x2a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2272
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1644 [inline]
allocate_slab+0x2c5/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:1784
new_slab mm/slub.c:1847 [inline]
new_slab_objects mm/slub.c:2593 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0x44c/0x7a0 mm/slub.c:2756
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0xa7/0xf0 mm/slub.c:2796
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2878 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2920 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x315/0x330 mm/slub.c:4063
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:561 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline]
tomoyo_commit_ok+0x1e/0x90 security/tomoyo/memory.c:76
tomoyo_update_domain+0x5de/0x850 security/tomoyo/domain.c:139
tomoyo_update_path_number_acl security/tomoyo/file.c:691 [inline]
tomoyo_write_file+0x68b/0x7f0 security/tomoyo/file.c:1034
tomoyo_write_domain2+0x116/0x1d0 security/tomoyo/common.c:1152
tomoyo_add_entry security/tomoyo/common.c:2042 [inline]
tomoyo_supervisor+0xbc9/0xf00 security/tomoyo/common.c:2103
tomoyo_audit_path_number_log security/tomoyo/file.c:235 [inline]
tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x419/0x590 security/tomoyo/file.c:734
security_file_ioctl+0x50/0xb0 security/security.c:1539
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:1063 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:1055 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xb3/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
page_owner free stack trace missing
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888043cca000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
ffff888043cca080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888043cca100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888043cca180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff888043cca200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
---
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For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
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