[PATCH v2 6/8] Bluetooth: use inclusive language in SMP
From: Archie Pusaka
Date: Mon May 31 2021 - 04:39:54 EST
From: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
This patch replaces some non-inclusive terms based on the appropriate
language mapping table compiled by the Bluetooth SIG:
https://specificationrefs.bluetooth.com/language-mapping/Appropriate_Language_Mapping_Table.pdf
Specifically, these terms are replaced:
master -> initiator
slave -> responder
Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes in v2:
* Add details in commit message
* Use initiator/responder instead of central/peripheral
include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h | 2 +-
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 10 +++---
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/bluetooth/smp.h | 6 ++--
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h b/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h
index a03c62b1dc2f..23a0524061b7 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ struct mgmt_cp_load_link_keys {
struct mgmt_ltk_info {
struct mgmt_addr_info addr;
__u8 type;
- __u8 master;
+ __u8 initiator;
__u8 enc_size;
__le16 ediv;
__le64 rand;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
index 91d36c3bf23e..6adee6de1e03 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
@@ -6169,7 +6169,7 @@ static int load_irks(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *cp_data,
static bool ltk_is_valid(struct mgmt_ltk_info *key)
{
- if (key->master != 0x00 && key->master != 0x01)
+ if (key->initiator != 0x00 && key->initiator != 0x01)
return false;
switch (key->addr.type) {
@@ -6247,11 +6247,11 @@ static int load_long_term_keys(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
switch (key->type) {
case MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED:
authenticated = 0x00;
- type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
+ type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER;
break;
case MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED:
authenticated = 0x01;
- type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
+ type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER;
break;
case MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH:
authenticated = 0x00;
@@ -8646,7 +8646,7 @@ static u8 mgmt_ltk_type(struct smp_ltk *ltk)
{
switch (ltk->type) {
case SMP_LTK:
- case SMP_LTK_SLAVE:
+ case SMP_LTK_RESPONDER:
if (ltk->authenticated)
return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED;
return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED;
@@ -8692,7 +8692,7 @@ void mgmt_new_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_ltk *key, bool persistent)
ev.key.rand = key->rand;
if (key->type == SMP_LTK)
- ev.key.master = 1;
+ ev.key.initiator = 1;
/* Make sure we copy only the significant bytes based on the
* encryption key size, and set the rest of the value to zeroes.
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 54242711aa67..f357bc6e5366 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ struct smp_chan {
u8 id_addr_type;
u8 irk[16];
struct smp_csrk *csrk;
- struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
+ struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk;
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
- struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
+ struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk;
struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
u8 *link_key;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
- kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk);
kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
@@ -776,9 +776,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
}
- if (smp->slave_ltk) {
- list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
- kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
+ if (smp->responder_ltk) {
+ list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list);
+ kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu);
}
if (smp->remote_irk) {
@@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
int ret;
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
- conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+ conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
@@ -1021,8 +1021,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
else
auth = 0;
- /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
- * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
+ /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
+ * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
* STK never needs to be stored).
*/
hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
@@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
}
- if (smp->slave_csrk) {
- smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
+ if (smp->responder_csrk) {
+ smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent);
}
if (smp->ltk) {
@@ -1089,10 +1089,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
}
- if (smp->slave_ltk) {
- smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
+ if (smp->responder_ltk) {
+ smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent);
}
if (smp->link_key) {
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
- struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident;
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
u8 authenticated;
__le16 ediv;
@@ -1293,14 +1293,15 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
- SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+ SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk,
smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
- smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+ smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
ident.ediv = ediv;
ident.rand = rand;
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident),
+ &ident);
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
}
@@ -1343,7 +1344,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
}
- smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+ smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
@@ -2048,7 +2049,7 @@ static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
u8 auth;
- /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
+ /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
if (hcon->out)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -2084,7 +2085,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+ hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2251,7 +2253,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
- /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
+ /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
return true;
@@ -2467,7 +2469,7 @@ int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
/* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
* remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
smp->ltk = NULL;
- smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
+ smp->responder_ltk = NULL;
smp->remote_irk = NULL;
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
@@ -2503,7 +2505,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@@ -2512,9 +2514,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
-static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
@@ -2913,7 +2915,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
- /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
+ /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
}
@@ -3000,8 +3002,8 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
break;
- case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
- reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+ case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT:
+ reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb);
break;
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index fc35a8bf358e..87a59ec2c9f0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info {
__u8 ltk[16];
} __packed;
-#define SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT 0x07
-struct smp_cmd_master_ident {
+#define SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT 0x07
+struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident {
__le16 ediv;
__le64 rand;
} __packed;
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify {
enum {
SMP_STK,
SMP_LTK,
- SMP_LTK_SLAVE,
+ SMP_LTK_RESPONDER,
SMP_LTK_P256,
SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG,
};
--
2.32.0.rc0.204.g9fa02ecfa5-goog