Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del
From: SyzScope
Date: Thu Jun 03 2021 - 14:30:17 EST
Hi developers,
Besides the control flow hijacking primitive we sent before, we managed
to discover an additional double free primitive in this bug, making this
bug even more dangerous.
We created a web page with detailed descriptions:
https://sites.google.com/view/syzscope/kasan-use-after-free-read-in-hci_chan_del
We understand that creating a patch can be time-consuming and there is
probably a long list of bugs pending fixes. We hope that our security
analysis can enable an informed decision on which bugs to fix first
(prioritization).
Since the bug has been on syzbot for over ten months (first found on
08-03-2020 and still can be triggered on 05-08-2021), it is best to have
the bug fixed early enough to avoid it being weaponized.
On 5/28/2021 2:12 PM, SyzScope wrote:
Sorry for the confusion on our last email. We did a little more
analysis after then and hope to help developers fix this bug.
The bug was reported by syzbot first in Aug 2020. Since it remains
unpatched to this date, we have conducted some analysis to determine
its security impact and root causes, which hopefully can help with the
patching decisions.
Specifically, we find that even though it is labeled as "UAF read" by
syzbot, it can in fact lead to double free and control flow hijacking
as well. Here is our analysis below (on this kernel version:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/log/?id=af5043c89a8ef6b6949a245fff355a552eaed240)
----------------------------- Root cause analysis:
--------------------------
The use-after-free bug happened because the object has two different
references. But when it was freed, only one reference was removed,
allowing the other reference to be used incorrectly.
Specifically, the object of type "struct hci_chan" can be referenced
in two places from an object called hcon(or conn in hci_chan_create)of
type struct hci_conn : "hcon->chan_list" and
"hcon->l2cap_data->hchan". But only one of them (conn->chan_list) was
deleted when freeing "struct hci_chan" from
"hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt()".
The function "hci_chan_create" shows how the first reference is created.
struct hci_chan *hci_chan_create(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_chan *chan;
...
chan = kzalloc(sizeof(*chan), GFP_KERNEL);
...
list_add_rcu(&chan->list, &conn->chan_list); // Assign chan to
hcon->chan_list. This is the first reference created.
return chan;
}
"l2cap_conn_add" is the caller of the previous function which shows
how the second reference is created.
static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
struct hci_chan *hchan;
...
hchan = hci_chan_create(hcon); //"hchan" was created in
hci_chan_create
if (!hchan)
return NULL;
conn = kzalloc(sizeof(*conn), GFP_KERNEL);
...
kref_init(&conn->ref);
hcon->l2cap_data = conn;
conn->hcon = hci_conn_get(hcon);
conn->hchan = hchan; // "chan" was assigned to
"hcon->l2cap_data->hchan". This is the second reference.
...
}
When the chan was freed in "hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt"
(hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt()->amp_destroy_logical_link()->hci_chan_del()),
we only deleted the reference of "((struct hci_conn
*)hcon)->chan_list" (effectively removing the entry from the list),
but the reference of "((struct hci_conn *)hcon)->l2cap_data->hchan" is
still valid.
The function below shows exactly how the free of the object occurs and
how its first reference is removed.
void hci_chan_del(struct hci_chan *chan)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("%s hcon %p chan %p", hdev->name, conn, chan);
list_del_rcu(&chan->list); // removed "chan" from the list (the
first reference). The second reference((struct hci_conn
*)hcon->l2cap_data->hchan) remains however.
synchronize_rcu();
set_bit(HCI_CONN_DROP, &conn->flags);
hci_conn_put(conn);
skb_queue_purge(&chan->data_q);
kfree(chan); // free "chan"
}
----------------------------- Potential fix: --------------------------
Based on the analysis, it appears that in hci_chan_del(), we should
remove the second reference of (struct hci_conn
*)hcon->l2cap_data->hchan,e.g., setting it to NULL
-------------------------- Control flow hijacking Primitve:
-----------------------------
This function is where the bug impact was originally reported on syzbot
void hci_chan_del(struct hci_chan *chan) //"chan" was freed
{
struct hci_conn *conn = chan->conn; // Syzbot reported the UAF read
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
...
skb_queue_purge(&chan->data_q); // "data_q" comes from the freed
object "chan" therefore it can point to an arbitrary memory address
kfree(chan);
}
The skb was dequeued from the list, however the list is controllable
by an attacker and it can point to an arbitrary memory address.
void skb_queue_purge(struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(list)) != NULL) // skb is also controllable
kfree_skb(skb); // dangerous use of skb further down
}
After going through a long call chain:
skb_queue_purge->kfree_skb->__kfree_skb->skb_release_all->skb_release_data,
skb enters "skb_zcopy_clear".
static void skb_release_data(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
...
skb_zcopy_clear(skb, true); // skb entered skb_zcopy_clear() and
will dereference a function pointer inside.
skb_free_head(skb);
}
static inline void skb_zcopy_clear(struct sk_buff *skb, bool zerocopy)
{
struct ubuf_info *uarg = skb_zcopy(skb); // uarg comes from skb,
therefore it also controllable by attacker
if (uarg) {
if (skb_zcopy_is_nouarg(skb)) {
/* no notification callback */
} else if (uarg->callback == sock_zerocopy_callback) {
uarg->zerocopy = uarg->zerocopy && zerocopy;
sock_zerocopy_put(uarg); // uarg enters sock_zerocopy_put()
}
...
}
}
Inside the function below, uarg's function pointer will be
dereferenced. This makes a control flow hijacking possible because
uarg is totally controllable by attackers.
void sock_zerocopy_put(struct ubuf_info *uarg)
{
if (uarg && refcount_dec_and_test(&uarg->refcnt)) {
if (uarg->callback)
uarg->callback(uarg, uarg->zerocopy); // uarg dereferences
a function pointer, and thus we grant a control flow hijacking primitive
...
}
}
SyzScope Team.
On 8/2/2020 1:45 PM, syzbot wrote:
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: ac3a0c84 Merge
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=11b8d570900000
kernel config:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e59ee776d5aa8d55
dashboard link:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=305a91e025a73e4fd6ce
compiler: clang version 10.0.0
(https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/
c2443155a0fb245c8f17f2c1c72b6ea391e86e81)
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=11f7ceea900000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17e5de04900000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the
commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+305a91e025a73e4fd6ce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
IPVS: ftp: loaded support on port[0] = 21
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_chan_del+0x33/0x130
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1707
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a9591f18 by task syz-executor081/6793
CPU: 0 PID: 6793 Comm: syz-executor081 Not tainted
5.8.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1f0/0x31e lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x66/0x5a0 mm/kasan/report.c:383
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
hci_chan_del+0x33/0x130 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1707
l2cap_conn_del+0x4c2/0x650 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1900
hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1355 [inline]
hci_conn_hash_flush+0x127/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1536
hci_dev_do_close+0xb7b/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1761
hci_unregister_dev+0x16d/0x1590 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3606
vhci_release+0x73/0xc0 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:340
__fput+0x2f0/0x750 fs/file_table.c:281
task_work_run+0x137/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:135
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:25 [inline]
do_exit+0x601/0x1f80 kernel/exit.c:805
do_group_exit+0x161/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:903
__do_sys_exit_group+0x13/0x20 kernel/exit.c:914
__se_sys_exit_group+0x10/0x10 kernel/exit.c:912
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x37/0x40 kernel/exit.c:912
do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x444fe8
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffe96e46e68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000444fe8
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000003c RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00000000004ccdd0 R08: 00000000000000e7 R09: ffffffffffffffd0
R10: 00007f5ee25cd700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00000000006e0200 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Allocated by task 6821:
save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x103/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:494
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x234/0x300 mm/slab.c:3551
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:555 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x270 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1692
l2cap_conn_add+0x66/0xb00 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7699
l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0x12b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8097
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1340 [inline]
hci_remote_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3210 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0x1164c/0x18260 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6061
hci_rx_work+0x236/0x9c0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4705
process_one_work+0x789/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0xaa4/0x1460 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x37e/0x3a0 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1234
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:293
Freed by task 1530:
save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:316 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:455
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
kfree+0x10a/0x220 mm/slab.c:3757
hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4999
[inline]
hci_event_packet+0x304e/0x18260 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6188
hci_rx_work+0x236/0x9c0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4705
process_one_work+0x789/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0xaa4/0x1460 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x37e/0x3a0 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1234
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:293
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a9591f00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
128-byte region [ffff8880a9591f00, ffff8880a9591f80)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002a56440 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0xffff8880a9591800
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002a5a648 ffffea00028a4a08 ffff8880aa400700
raw: ffff8880a9591800 ffff8880a9591000 000000010000000a 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880a9591e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880a9591e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8880a9591f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880a9591f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8880a9592000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
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syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
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