Re: [PATCH v13 4/8] KVM: arm64: Introduce MTE VM feature

[Catalin Marinas]

On Fri, Jun 04, 2021 at 11:42:11AM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> On 03/06/2021 17:00, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 11:45:09AM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> >> index c5d1f3c87dbd..226035cf7d6c 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> >> @@ -822,6 +822,42 @@ transparent_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
> >>  	return PAGE_SIZE;
> >>  }
> >>  
> >> +static int sanitise_mte_tags(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> >> +			     unsigned long size)
> >> +{
> >> +	if (kvm_has_mte(kvm)) {
> >> +		/*
> >> +		 * The page will be mapped in stage 2 as Normal Cacheable, so
> >> +		 * the VM will be able to see the page's tags and therefore
> >> +		 * they must be initialised first. If PG_mte_tagged is set,
> >> +		 * tags have already been initialised.
> >> +		 * pfn_to_online_page() is used to reject ZONE_DEVICE pages
> >> +		 * that may not support tags.
> >> +		 */
> >> +		unsigned long i, nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +		struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
> >> +
> >> +		if (!page)
> >> +			return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +		for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++) {
> >> +			/*
> >> +			 * There is a potential (but very unlikely) race
> >> +			 * between two VMs which are sharing a physical page
> >> +			 * entering this at the same time. However by splitting
> >> +			 * the test/set the only risk is tags being overwritten
> >> +			 * by the mte_clear_page_tags() call.
> >> +			 */
> > 
> > And I think the real risk here is when the page is writable by at least
> > one of the VMs sharing the page. This excludes KSM, so it only leaves
> > the MAP_SHARED mappings.
> > 
> >> +			if (!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) {
> >> +				mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page));
> >> +				set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags);
> >> +			}
> >> +		}
> > 
> > If we want to cover this race (I'd say in a separate patch), we can call
> > mte_sync_page_tags(page, __pte(0), false, true) directly (hopefully I
> > got the arguments right). We can avoid the big lock in most cases if
> > kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region() sets a VM_MTE_RESET (tag clear etc.)
> > and __alloc_zeroed_user_highpage() clears the tags on allocation (as we
> > do for VM_MTE but the new flag would not affect the stage 1 VMM page
> > attributes).
> 
> To be honest I'm coming round to just exporting a
> mte_prepare_page_tags() function which does the clear/set with the lock
> held. I doubt it's such a performance critical path that it will cause
> any noticeable issues. Then if we run into performance problems in the
> future we can start experimenting with extra VM flags etc as necessary.

It works for me.

> And from your later email:
> > Another idea: if VM_SHARED is found for any vma within a region in
> > kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(), we either prevent the enabling of MTE
> > for the guest or reject the memory slot if MTE was already enabled.
> > 
> > An alternative here would be to clear VM_MTE_ALLOWED so that any
> > subsequent mprotect(PROT_MTE) in the VMM would fail in
> > arch_validate_flags(). MTE would still be allowed in the guest but in
> > the VMM for the guest memory regions. We can probably do this
> > irrespective of VM_SHARED. Of course, the VMM can still mmap() the
> > memory initially with PROT_MTE but that's not an issue IIRC, only the
> > concurrent mprotect().
> 
> This could work, but I worry that it's potential fragile. Also the rules
> for what user space can do are not obvious and may be surprising. I'd
> also want to look into the likes of mremap() to see how easy it would be
> to ensure that we couldn't end up with VM_SHARED (or VM_MTE_ALLOWED)
> memory sneaking into a memslot.
> 
> Unless you think it's worth complicating the ABI in the hope of avoiding
> the big lock overhead I think it's probably best to stick with the big
> lock at least until we have more data on the overhead.

It's up to Marc but I think for now just make it safe and once we get
our hands on hardware, we can assess the impact. For example, starting
multiple VMs simultaneously will contend on such big lock but we have an
option to optimise it by setting PG_mte_tagged on allocation via a new
VM_* flag.

For my last suggestion above, changing the VMM ABI afterwards is a bit
tricky, so we could state now that VM_SHARED and MTE are not allowed
(though it needs a patch to enforce it). That's assuming that mprotect()
in the VMM cannot race with the user_mem_abort() on another CPU which
makes the lock necessary anyway.

> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >>  static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >>  			  struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
> >>  			  unsigned long fault_status)
> >> @@ -971,8 +1007,13 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >>  	if (writable)
> >>  		prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W;
> >>  
> >> -	if (fault_status != FSC_PERM && !device)
> >> +	if (fault_status != FSC_PERM && !device) {
> >> +		ret = sanitise_mte_tags(kvm, pfn, vma_pagesize);
> >> +		if (ret)
> >> +			goto out_unlock;
> > 
> > Maybe it was discussed in a previous version, why do we need this in
> > addition to kvm_set_spte_gfn()?
> 
> kvm_set_spte_gfn() is only used for the MMU notifier path (e.g. if a
> memslot is changed by the VMM). For the initial access we will normally
> fault the page into stage 2 with user_mem_abort().

Right. Can we move the sanitise_mte_tags() call to
kvm_pgtable_stage2_map() instead or we don't have the all the
information needed?

-- 
Catalin