[patch V2 03/14] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer

From: Thomas Gleixner
Date: Sat Jun 05 2021 - 20:32:39 EST


From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>

Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.

__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers are
preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers. If this happens, then there is a window in which
__fpu__restore_sig() could schedule out and the victim task could schedule
back in without reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part
of the FPU state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking
into the victim task's user-visible state.

Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.

[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
microarchitectural conditions"

Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
V2: Amend changelog - Borislav
---
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -369,6 +369,27 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __use
fpregs_unlock();
return 0;
}
+
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) {
+ /*
+ * The FPU registers do not belong to current, and
+ * we just did an FPU restore operation, restricted
+ * to the user portion of the register file, and
+ * failed. In the event that the ucode was
+ * unfriendly and modified the registers at all, we
+ * need to make sure that we aren't corrupting an
+ * innocent non-current task's registers.
+ */
+ __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state();
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * As above, we may have just clobbered current's
+ * user FPU state. We will either successfully
+ * load it or clear it below, so no action is
+ * required here.
+ */
+ }
+
fpregs_unlock();
} else {
/*