[PATCH v28 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
From: Casey Schaufler
Date: Thu Jul 22 2021 - 00:02:12 EST
Change the security_task_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: linux-audit@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +-----
include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 16 +++-----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 56 +++++++++++++++------------
security/security.c | 25 +++++++++---
10 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 3e97a6de5e80..96dd728809ef 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2710,7 +2710,6 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
@@ -2723,16 +2722,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
* here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
* case well anyway.
*/
- security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 886128899d5f..4070cef152f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -500,8 +500,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1197,14 +1197,16 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 22286163e93e..d92c7b894183 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2139,19 +2139,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2359,6 +2352,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2369,7 +2363,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 6a04d762d272..1ba14a7a38f7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1362,8 +1361,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
- &sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ &blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b4d214b21b97..50e3f2f4cb49 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -477,7 +477,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -674,17 +673,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
@@ -2439,12 +2430,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2460,6 +2454,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2471,7 +2466,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2492,7 +2489,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 5cbbc469ac7c..098d0a1a3330 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1564,11 +1564,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 6190cbf94bf0..aa31f7bf79ee 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
*/
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index ef9dcfce45d4..e3d903d6e5e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -71,14 +71,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+ blob.secid[0], func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 287b90509006..29befd24b945 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -388,12 +388,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -419,9 +420,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -429,11 +430,12 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
+ /* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL);
+ current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
+ MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -469,10 +471,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -493,10 +497,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -672,7 +677,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -692,8 +697,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
0, MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -722,7 +728,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -735,9 +741,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+ size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -859,7 +866,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
return;
@@ -879,9 +886,10 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c38816ef9778..458fded340ab 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1904,17 +1904,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_subj,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid_subj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
--
2.31.1