Re: [PATCH RFC v2 10/12] KEYS: link system_trusted_keys to mok_trusted_keys

[Mimi Zohar]

On Thu, 2021-08-05 at 19:29 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:

> > From the thread discussion on 00/12:
> > 
> > Only the builtin keys should ever be on the builtin keyring.  The
> > builtin keyring would need to be linked to the mok keyring.  But in the
> > secondary keyring case, the mok keyring would be linked to the
> > secondary keyring, similar to how the builtin keyring is linked to the
> > secondary keyring.
> > 
> >        if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0)
> >                panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n");
> 
> 
> This part is confusing me though.
> 
> Here are some of the tests I’m performing with the current series:
> 
> Initial setup:
> Create and enroll my own key into the MOK.
> Sign a kernel, kernel module and IMA key with my new CA key.
> Boot with lockdown enabled (to enforce sig validation).
> 
> Kernel built with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
> 
> $ keyctl show %:.secondary_trusted_keys
> Keyring
>  530463486 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .secondary_trusted_keys
>  411466727 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ keyring: .builtin_trusted_keys
>  979167715 ---lswrv      0     0   |   \_ asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: 07a56e29cfa1e21379aff2c522efff7d1963202a
>  534573591 ---lswrv      0     0   |   \_ asymmetric: Oracle-CA: Oracle certificate signing key: aeefb4bfde095cacaabff81dd266974b1b4e23b8
>  968109018 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ keyring: .mok
>  857795115 ---lswrv      0     0       \_ asymmetric: Erics-CA: UEK signing key: 9bfa6860483aa46bd83f7fa1289d9fc35799e93b
> 
> With this setup I can:
> * load a kernel module signed with my CA key
> * run "kexec -ls" with the kernel signed with my CA key
> * run "kexec -ls" with a kernel signed by a key in the platform keyring
> * load another key into the secondary trusted keyring that is signed by my CA key
> * load a key into the ima keyring, signed by my CA key
> 
> Kernel built without CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING defined
> 
> $ keyctl show %:.builtin_trusted_keys
> Keyring
>  812785375 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .builtin_trusted_keys
>  455418681 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ keyring: .mok
>  910809006 ---lswrv      0     0   |   \_ asymmetric: Erics-CA: UEK signing key: 9bfa6860483aa46bd83f7fa1289d9fc35799e93b
>  115345009 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ asymmetric: Oracle-CA: Oracle certificate signing key: aeefb4bfde095cacaabff81dd266974b1b4e23b8
>  513131506 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: 22353509f203b55b84f15d0aadeddc134b646185
> 
> With this setup I can:
> * load a kernel module signed with my CA key
> * run "kexec -ls" with the kernel signed with my CA key
> * run "kexec -ls" with a kernel signed by a key in the platform keyring
> * load a key into the ima keyring, signed by my CA key
> 
> So why would the linking need to be switched?  Is there a test I’m
> missing?  Thanks.

It's a question of semantics.  The builtin keyring name is self
describing.  It should only contain the keys compiled into the kernel
or inserted post build into the reserved memory.  Not only the kernel
uses the builtin keyring, but userspace may as well[1].  Other users of
the builtin keyring might not want to trust the mok keyring as well.

thanks,

Mimi

[1] Refer to Mat Martineau's LSS 2019 talk titled "Using and
Implementing Keyring Restrictions in Userspace".