On Tue, Sep 7, 2021 at 1:13 PM Pawan Gupta
<pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
After applying this patch, the output of
On 06.09.2021 10:46, Hao Peng wrote:
>If hypervisor does not support MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, but guest supports
>RTM and HLE features, it will affect TAA mitigation.
Guests are on purpose not allowed to control TSX via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
otherwise a malicious guest can enable TSX and attack host or other
guests. The TAA mitigation within a guest is same as MDS i.e.
micro-architectural buffer clear using VERW instruction. Support for
VERW is added by the microcode update and enumerate by
MSR_ARCH_CAP[MD_CLEAR] bit.
>Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <flyingpeng@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
>index 9c7a5f049292..5e852c14fef2 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
>@@ -122,6 +122,13 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
>
> if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported()) {
> tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
>+
>+ /* If hypervisor does not support MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL emulation,
>+ * but guest supports RTM and HLE features, it will affect TAA
>+ * (tsx_async_abort)mitigation.
>+ */
>+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
>+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
This is not correct. TSX feature can exist without TSX_CTRL MSR.
Moreover, clearing the cached bits with setup_clear_cpu_cap() doesn't
disable the TSX feature in CPU.
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
becomes “Mitigation: TSX disabled”.Do you mean that tsx is still
enabled in this case in guest?
I made a mistake in the description before. This problem occurred
under the qemu -cpu Icelake-server .
When I debug this problem to -cpu host, the guest can see taa-no.
Thanks.