[PATCH 4.19 128/293] bpf: correct slot_type marking logic to allow more stack slot sharing

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon Sep 20 2021 - 13:45:14 EST


From: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 0bae2d4d62d523f06ff1a8e88ce38b45400acd28 upstream.

Verifier is supposed to support sharing stack slot allocated to ptr with
SCALAR_VALUE for privileged program. However this doesn't happen for some
cases.

The reason is verifier is not clearing slot_type STACK_SPILL for all bytes,
it only clears part of them, while verifier is using:

slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL

as a convention to check one slot is ptr type.

So, the consequence of partial clearing slot_type is verifier could treat a
partially overridden ptr slot, which should now be a SCALAR_VALUE slot,
still as ptr slot, and rejects some valid programs.

Before this patch, test_xdp_noinline.o under bpf selftests, bpf_lxc.o and
bpf_netdev.o under Cilium bpf repo, when built with -mattr=+alu32 are
rejected due to this issue. After this patch, they all accepted.

There is no processed insn number change before and after this patch on
Cilium bpf programs.

Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
[OP: adjusted context for 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1039,6 +1039,10 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_

/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
+ /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */
+ if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL)
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
+ state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC;

/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
* otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
@@ -1056,6 +1060,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_
register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno]))
type = STACK_ZERO;

+ /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
type;
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -956,16 +956,46 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
/* mess up with R1 pointer on stack */
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -7, 0x23),
- /* fill back into R0 should fail */
+ /* fill back into R0 is fine for priv.
+ * R0 now becomes SCALAR_VALUE.
+ */
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+ /* Load from R0 should fail. */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
- .errstr = "corrupted spill",
+ .errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv",
.result = REJECT,
.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
},
{
+ "check corrupted spill/fill, LSB",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0xcafe),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .retval = POINTER_VALUE,
+ },
+ {
+ "check corrupted spill/fill, MSB",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0x12345678),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .retval = POINTER_VALUE,
+ },
+ {
"invalid src register in STX",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -1, -1),