RE: [RFC 06/20] iommu: Add iommu_device_init[exit]_user_dma interfaces

[Tian, Kevin]

> From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 2021 7:55 PM
> 
> On Tue, Sep 28, 2021 at 07:13:01AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> > > From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Sent: Monday, September 27, 2021 10:40 PM
> > >
> > > On Mon, Sep 27, 2021 at 01:32:34PM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> > >
> > > > but I'm little worried that even vfio-pci itself cannot be bound now,
> > > > which implies that all devices in a group which are intended to be
> > > > used by the user must be bound to vfio-pci in a breath before the
> > > > user attempts to open any of them, i.e. late-binding and device-
> > > > hotplug is disallowed after the initial open. I'm not sure how
> > > > important such an usage would be, but it does cause user-tangible
> > > > semantics change.
> > >
> > > Oh, that's bad..
> > >
> > > I guess your approach is the only way forward, it will have to be
> > > extensively justified in the commit message for Greg et al.
> > >
> >
> > Just thought about another alternative. What about having driver
> > core to call iommu after call_driver_probe()?
> 
> Then the kernel is now already exposed to an insecure scenario, we
> must not do probe if any user device is attached at all.
> 

Originally I thought it's fine as long as the entire probe process
is not completed. Based on your comment I feel your concern is
that no guarantee that the driver won't do any iommu related 
work in its probe function thus it's insecure?

Thanks
Kevin