Re: [PATCH V9 7/9] vhost: introduce vDPA-based backend

[Jason Gunthorpe]

On Tue, Nov 02, 2021 at 11:52:20AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 1, 2021 at 10:11 PM Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 10:01:23PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > > From: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@xxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > This patch introduces a vDPA-based vhost backend. This backend is
> > > built on top of the same interface defined in virtio-vDPA and provides
> > > a generic vhost interface for userspace to accelerate the virtio
> > > devices in guest.
> > >
> > > This backend is implemented as a vDPA device driver on top of the same
> > > ops used in virtio-vDPA. It will create char device entry named
> > > vhost-vdpa-$index for userspace to use. Userspace can use vhost ioctls
> > > on top of this char device to setup the backend.
> > >
> > > Vhost ioctls are extended to make it type agnostic and behave like a
> > > virtio device, this help to eliminate type specific API like what
> > > vhost_net/scsi/vsock did:
> > >
> > > - VHOST_VDPA_GET_DEVICE_ID: get the virtio device ID which is defined
> > >   by virtio specification to differ from different type of devices
> > > - VHOST_VDPA_GET_VRING_NUM: get the maximum size of virtqueue
> > >   supported by the vDPA device
> > > - VHSOT_VDPA_SET/GET_STATUS: set and get virtio status of vDPA device
> > > - VHOST_VDPA_SET/GET_CONFIG: access virtio config space
> > > - VHOST_VDPA_SET_VRING_ENABLE: enable a specific virtqueue
> > >
> > > For memory mapping, IOTLB API is mandated for vhost-vDPA which means
> > > userspace drivers are required to use
> > > VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE/VHOST_IOTLB_INVALIDATE to add or remove mapping for
> > > a specific userspace memory region.
> > >
> > > The vhost-vDPA API is designed to be type agnostic, but it allows net
> > > device only in current stage. Due to the lacking of control virtqueue
> > > support, some features were filter out by vhost-vdpa.
> > >
> > > We will enable more features and devices in the near future.
> >
> > [..]
> >
> > > +static int vhost_vdpa_alloc_domain(struct vhost_vdpa *v)
> > > +{
> > > +     struct vdpa_device *vdpa = v->vdpa;
> > > +     const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config;
> > > +     struct device *dma_dev = vdpa_get_dma_dev(vdpa);
> > > +     struct bus_type *bus;
> > > +     int ret;
> > > +
> > > +     /* Device want to do DMA by itself */
> > > +     if (ops->set_map || ops->dma_map)
> > > +             return 0;
> > > +
> > > +     bus = dma_dev->bus;
> > > +     if (!bus)
> > > +             return -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > +     if (!iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY))
> > > +             return -ENOTSUPP;
> > > +
> > > +     v->domain = iommu_domain_alloc(bus);
> > > +     if (!v->domain)
> > > +             return -EIO;
> > > +
> > > +     ret = iommu_attach_device(v->domain, dma_dev);
> > > +     if (ret)
> > > +             goto err_attach;
> > >
> >
> > I've been looking at the security of iommu_attach_device() users, and
> > I wonder if this is safe?
> >
> > The security question is if userspace is able to control the DMA
> > address the devices uses? Eg if any of the cpu to device ring's are in
> > userspace memory?
> >
> > For instance if userspace can tell the device to send a packet from an
> > arbitrary user controlled address.
> 
> The map is validated via pin_user_pages() which guarantees that the
> address is not arbitrary and must belong to userspace?

That controls what gets put into the IOMMU, it doesn't restrict what
DMA the device itself can issue.

Upon investigating more it seems the answer is that
iommu_attach_device() requires devices to be in singleton groups, so
there is no leakage from rouge DMA

Jason