Re: [RFC PATCH v1] can: m_can: m_can_read_fifo: fix memory leak in error branch

[Marc Kleine-Budde]

On 30.10.2021 01:35:01, Vincent MAILHOL wrote:
> On Fri. 29 Oct 2021 at 20:34, Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On 27.10.2021 03:09:09, Vincent Mailhol wrote:
> > > In m_can_read_fifo(), if the second call to m_can_fifo_read() fails,
> > > the function jump to the out_fail label and returns without calling
> > > m_can_receive_skb(). This means that the skb previously allocated by
> > > alloc_can_skb() is not freed. In other terms, this is a memory leak.
> > >
> > > This patch adds a new goto statement: out_receive_skb and do some
> > > small code refactoring to fix the issue.
> >
> > This means we pass a skb to the user space, which contains wrong data.
> > Probably 0x0, but if the CAN frame doesn't contain 0x0, it's wrong. That
> > doesn't look like a good idea. If the CAN frame broke due to a CRC issue
> > on the wire it is not received. IMHO it's best to discard the skb and
> > return the error.
> 
> Arg... Guess I made the right choice to tag the patch as RFC...
> 
> Just one question, what is the correct function to discard the
> skb? The driver uses the napi polling system (which I am not
> entirely familiar with). Does it mean that the rx is not done in
> IRQ context and that we can simply use kfree_skb() instead of
> dev_kfree_skb_irq()?

The m_can driver is a bit more complicated. It uses NAPI for mmio
devices, but threaded IRQs for SPI devices. Looking at
dev_kfree_skb_any(), it checks for hard IRQs or IRQs disabled, I think
this is not the case for both threaded IRQs and NAPI.

https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15/source/net/core/dev.c#L3108

So I think kfree_skb() should be OK.

regards,
Marc

-- 
Pengutronix e.K.                 | Marc Kleine-Budde           |
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