Re: [PATCH V3 4/4] crypto: ccp - Add SEV_INIT_EX support

[Peter Gonda]

On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 4:39 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> On 11/12/21 10:55 AM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 8:32 AM Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 3:20 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 11/9/21 2:46 PM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 1:26 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 09, 2021, Peter Gonda wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 10:21 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>>> There's no need for this to be a function pointer, and the duplicate code can be
> >>>>>>> consolidated.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> static int sev_do_init_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *error)
> >>>>>>> {
> >>>>>>>          if (sev_es_tmr) {
> >>>>>>>                  /*
> >>>>>>>                   * Do not include the encryption mask on the physical
> >>>>>>>                   * address of the TMR (firmware should clear it anyway).
> >>>>>>>                   */
> >>>>>>>                  data.flags |= SEV_INIT_FLAGS_SEV_ES;
> >>>>>>>                  data.tmr_address = __pa(sev_es_tmr);
> >>>>>>>                  data.tmr_len = SEV_ES_TMR_SIZE;
> >>>>>>>          }
> >>>>>>>          return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &data, error);
> >>>>>>> }
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> static int __sev_init_locked(int *error)
> >>>>>>> {
> >>>>>>>          struct sev_data_init data;
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>          memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
> >>>>>>>          return sev_do_init_locked(cmd, &data, error);
> >>>>>>> }
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> static int __sev_init_ex_locked(int *error)
> >>>>>>> {
> >>>>>>>          struct sev_data_init_ex data;
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>          memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
> >>>>>>>          data.length = sizeof(data);
> >>>>>>>          data.nv_address = __psp_pa(sev_init_ex_nv_address);
> >>>>>>>          data.nv_len = NV_LENGTH;
> >>>>>>>          return sev_do_init_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT_EX, &data, error);
> >>>>>>> }
> >>>>>> I am missing how this removes the duplication of the retry code,
> >>>>>> parameter checking, and other error checking code.. With what you have
> >>>>>> typed out I would assume I still need to function pointer between
> >>>>>> __sev_init_ex_locked and __sev_init_locked. Can you please elaborate
> >>>>>> here?
> >>>>> Hmm.  Ah, I got distracted between the original thought, the realization that
> >>>>> the two commands used different structs, and typing up the above.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Also is there some reason the function pointer is not acceptable?
> >>>>> It's not unacceptable, it would just be nice to avoid, assuming the alternative
> >>>>> is cleaner.  But I don't think any alternative is cleaner, since as you pointed
> >>>>> out the above is a half-baked thought.
> >>>> OK I'll leave as is.
> >>>>
> >>>>>>>> +     rc = init_function(error);
> >>>>>>>>        if (rc && *error == SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID) {
> >>>>>>>>                /*
> >>>>>>>>                 * INIT command returned an integrity check failure
> >>>>>>>> @@ -286,8 +423,8 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> >>>>>>>>                 * failed and persistent state has been erased.
> >>>>>>>>                 * Retrying INIT command here should succeed.
> >>>>>>>>                 */
> >>>>>>>> -             dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV: retrying INIT command");
> >>>>>>>> -             rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &data, error);
> >>>>>>>> +             dev_notice(sev->dev, "SEV: retrying INIT command");
> >>>>>>>> +             rc = init_function(error);
> >>>>>>> The above comment says "persistent state has been erased", but __sev_do_cmd_locked()
> >>>>>>> only writes back to the file if a relevant command was successful, which means
> >>>>>>> that rereading the userspace file in __sev_init_ex_locked() will retry INIT_EX
> >>>>>>> with the same garbage data.
> >>>>>> Ack my mistake, that comment is stale. I will update it so its correct
> >>>>>> for the INIT and INIT_EX flows.
> >>>>>>> IMO, the behavior should be to read the file on load and then use the kernel buffer
> >>>>>>> without ever reloading (unless this is built as a module and is unloaded and reloaded).
> >>>>>>> The writeback then becomes opportunistic in the sense that if it fails for some reason,
> >>>>>>> the kernel's internal state isn't blasted away.
> >>>>>> One issue here is that the file read can fail on load so we use the
> >>>>>> late retry to guarantee we can read the file.
> >>>>> But why continue loading if reading the file fails on load?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> The other point seems like preference. Users may wish to shutdown the PSP FW,
> >>>>>> load a new file, and INIT_EX again with that new data. Why should we preclude
> >>>>>> them from that functionality?
> >>>>> I don't think we should preclude that functionality, but it needs to be explicitly
> >>>>> tied to a userspace action, e.g. either on module load or on writing the param to
> >>>>> change the path.  If the latter is allowed, then it needs to be denied if the PSP
> >>>>> is initialized, otherwise the kernel will be in a non-coherent state and AFAICT
> >>>>> userspace will have a heck of a time even understanding what state has been used
> >>>>> to initialize the PSP.
> >>>> If this driver is builtin the filesystem will be unavailable during
> >>>> __init. Using the existing retries already built into
> >>>> sev_platform_init() also the file to be read once userspace is
> >>>> running, meaning the file system is usable. As I tried to explain in
> >>>> the commit message. We could remove the sev_platform_init call during
> >>>> sev_pci_init since this only actually needs to be initialized when the
> >>>> first command requiring it is issues (either reading some keys/certs
> >>>> from the PSP or launching an SEV guest). Then userspace in both the
> >>>> builtin and module usage would know running one of those commands
> >>>> cause the file to be read for PSP usage. Tom any thoughts on this?
> >>>>
> >>> One thing to note is that if we do the INIT on the first command then
> >>> the first guest launch will take a longer. The init command is not
> >>> cheap (especially with the SNP, it may take a longer because it has to
> >>> do all those RMP setup etc). IIRC, in my early SEV series in I was doing
> >>> the INIT during the first command execution and based on the
> >>> recommendation moved to do the init on probe.
> >>>
> >>> Should we add a module param to control whether to do INIT on probe or
> >>> delay until the first command ?
> >> Thats a good point Brijesh. I've only been testing this with SEV and
> >> ES so haven't noticed that long setup time. I like the idea of a
> >> module parameter to decide when to INIT, that should satisfy Sean's
> >> concern that the user doesn't know when the INIT_EX file would be read
> >> and that there is extra retry code (duplicated between sev_pci_init
> >> and all the PSP commands). I'll get started on that.
> > I need a little guidance on how to proceed with this. Should I have
> > the new module parameter 'psp_init_on_probe' just disable PSP init on
> > module init if false. Or should it also disable PSP init during
> > command flow if it's true?
> >
> > I was thinking I should just have 'psp_init_on_probe' default to true,
> > and if false it stops the PSP init during sev_pci_init(). If I add the
> > second change that seems like it changes the ABI. Thoughts?
> >
> Good point that a module params may break the ABI. How about if we add a
> new ioctl that can be used to initialize the SEV_INIT_EX. The ioctl
> implementation will be similar to the PLATFORM_RESET; it will shutdown
> the firmware then call INIT_EX. A platform provisioning tool may use ioctl.

Would just a 'skip_psp_init_on_probe' parameter be simpler. We default
to false but if users set it, we can skip that init attempt in
sev_pci_init(). The init attempts on all other commands that require
the INIT state would then provide users with INIT_EX functionality.
They would also know exactly when INIT or INIT_EX would be attempted
based on the parameter.

Otherwise a new ioctl sounds reasonable.

>
> -Brijesh
>