Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND] m68k/kernel: array out of bound access in process_uboot_commandline

[Greg Ungerer]

Hi Hangyu,

On 13/1/22 11:58 am, Hangyu Hua wrote:
> When the size of commandp >= size, array out of bound write occurs because
> len == 0.
>
> Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>   arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c | 3 ++-
>   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c
> index 928dbd33fc4a..63eaf3c3ddcd 100644
> --- a/arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c
> +++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c
> @@ -101,5 +101,6 @@ __init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size)
>   	}
>   
>   	parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
> -	commandp[len - 1] = 0;
> +	if (len > 0)
> +		commandp[len - 1] = 0;
>   }

I am not convinced this is wrong for the reason you think it is.
Looking at the code in its entirety:

__init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size)
{
        int len, n;

        n = strnlen(commandp, size);
        commandp += n;
        len = size - n;
        if (len) {
                /* Add the whitespace separator */
                *commandp++ = ' ';
                len--;
        }

        parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
        commandp[len - 1] = 0;
}


"commandp" is moved based on the return of the strnlen(). So in the
case of commandp actually being full of valid characters (so n == size,
and thus len == 0) the commandp technically points outside of its
real size at that point. But "command[[len - 1]" would actually be
pointing to the last char in the original commandp array (so the original
commandp[size - 1]). Well at least if you are happy with the use of
negative array indexes.

Clearly this could be structured better. There is no point in calling
parse_uboot_commandline() if len == 0, or even if len == 1, since you
cannot add anymore to the command line, it is full.

Regards
Greg