On Mon, Jan 24, 2022, Like Xu wrote:
On 24/1/2022 3:06 pm, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 1:50 PM
From: Like Xu <likexu@xxxxxxxxxxx>
A malicious user space can bypass xstate_get_guest_group_perm() in the
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID mechanism and obtain unpermitted xfeatures,
since the validity check of xcr0 depends only on guest_supported_xcr0.
Unpermitted xfeatures cannot pass kvm_check_cpuid()...
Indeed, 5ab2f45bba4894a0db4af8567da3efd6228dd010.
This part of logic is pretty fragile and fragmented due to semantic
inconsistencies between supported_xcr0 and guest_supported_xcr0
in other three places:
There are no inconsistencies, at least not in the examples below, as the examples
are intended to work in host context. guest_supported_xcr0 is about what the guest
is/isn't allowed to access, it has no bearing on what host userspace can/can't do.
Or are you talking about a different type of inconsistency?
- __do_cpuid_func
Reporting what KVM supports to host userspace.
- kvm_mpx_supported
This is a check on host support.
- kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave
"write" from host userspace.
Have you identified all their areas of use ?