Re: [PATCH] x86/perf: Default freeze_on_smi on for Comet Lake and later.

[Liang, Kan]

On 1/24/2022 9:59 PM, Kyle Huey wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 8:01 AM Liang, Kan <kan.liang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On 1/24/2022 7:21 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 11:26:44PM -0800, Kyle Huey wrote:
> > > > Beginning in Comet Lake, Intel extended the concept of privilege rings to
> > > > SMM.[0] A side effect of this is that events caused by execution of code
> > > > in SMM are now visible to performance counters with IA32_PERFEVTSELx.USR
> > > > set.
> > > >
> > > > rr[1] depends on exact counts of performance events for the user space
> > > > tracee, so this change in behavior is fatal for us. It is, however, easily
> > > > corrected by setting IA32_DEBUGCTL.FREEZE_WHILE_SMM to 1 (visible in sysfs
> > > > as /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi). While we can and will tell our users to
> > > > set freeze_on_smi manually when appropriate, because observing events in
> > > > SMM is rarely useful to anyone, we propose to change the default value of
> > > > this switch.
> >
> > + Andi
> >
> >   From we heard many times from sophisticated customers, they really hate
> > blind spots. They want to see everything. That's why we set
> > freeze_on_smi to 0 as default. I think the patch breaks the principle.
>
> The default kernel settings for perf events prioritize preventing
> information leaks to less privileged code. perf_event_paranoid
> defaults to 2, preventing unprivileged users from observing kernel
> space. If "sophisticated customers" want to see everything they have
> already needed privileges (or an explicit opt-in through decreasing
> perf_event_paranoid) for some time.
>
> The current situation on Comet Lake+ where an unprivileged user
> *cannot* observe kernel code due to security concerns but
> simultaneously *must* observe SMM code seems rather absurd.

I see. I was thought the unprivileged user can observe the SMM code on 
the previous platforms. The CML+ change only makes part of the SMM code 
CPL0. Seems I'm wrong. The change looks like changing the previous CPL0 
code to CPL3 code. If so, yes, I think we should prevent the information 
leaks for the unprivileged user.

> > I don't think there is a way to notify all the users that the default
> > kernel value will be changed. (Yes, the end user can always check the
> > /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi to get the latest value. But in practice,
> > no one checks it unless some errors found.) I think it may bring
> > troubles to the users if they rely on the counts in SMM.
>
> Unfortunately the new hardware has already changed the behavior
> without notifying users, no matter what we do here.
>
> > The patch only changes the default values for some platforms, not all
> > platforms. The default value is not consistent among platforms anymore.
> > It can bring confusion.
>
> I don't personally object to changing freeze_on_smi for all platforms
> :) I was merely trying to limit the changes.


Changing it to all platforms seems a too big hammer. I agree we should 
limit it to the impacted platforms.

I've contacted the author of the white paper. I was told that the change 
is for the client vPro platforms. They are not sure whether it impacts 
Server platform or Atom platforms. I'm still working on it. I will let 
you and Peter know once I get more information.

Thanks,
Kan