On Mar 8, 2022, at 5:45 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 21:31 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
On 3/7/22 18:38, Eric Snowberg wrote:
Isn't x509_cert_parse() being called as part of parsing the certificate?
On Mar 7, 2022, at 4:01 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 18:06 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 6b1ac5f5896a..49bb2ea7f609 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -108,6 +108,49 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
CA = root CA here, right?
Yes, I’ll update the comment
Updating the comment is not enough. There's an existing function named
"x509_check_for_self_signed()" which determines whether the certificate
is self-signed.
Originally I tried using that function. However when the restrict link code is called,
all the necessary x509 information is no longer available. The code in
restrict_link_by_ca is basically doing the equivalent to x509_check_for_self_signed.
After verifying the cert has the CA flag set, the call to public_key_verify_signature
validates the cert is self signed.
If so, it seems to check for a self-signed certificate every time. You
could add something like the following to x509_check_for_self_signed(cert):
pub->x509_self_signed = cert->self_signed = true;
This could then reduce the function in 3/4 to something like:
return payload->data[asym_crypto]->x509_self_signed;
When I was studying the restriction code, before writing this patch, it looked like
it was written from the standpoint to be as generic as possible. All code contained
within it works on either a public_key_signature or a public_key. I had assumed it
was written this way to be used with different asymmetrical key types now and in
the future. I called the public_key_verify_signature function instead of interrogating
the x509 payload to keep in line with what I thought was the original design. Let me
know if I should be carrying x509 code in here to make the change above.