[PATCH 4.19 33/33] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref()

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Thu Mar 10 2022 - 09:33:23 EST


From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>

Commit 66e3531b33ee51dad17c463b4d9c9f52e341503d upstream.

When calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() the returned value must
be tested and the reaction to that value should be appropriate.

In case of failure in xennet_get_responses() the reaction should not be
to crash the system, but to disable the network device.

The calls in setup_netfront() can be replaced by calls of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(). While at it avoid double free of ring
pages and grant references via xennet_disconnect_backend() in this case.

This is CVE-2022-23042 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -862,7 +862,6 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct n
int max = XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN + (rx->status <= RX_COPY_THRESHOLD);
int slots = 1;
int err = 0;
- unsigned long ret;

if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_extra_info) {
err = xennet_get_extras(queue, extras, rp);
@@ -893,8 +892,13 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct n
goto next;
}

- ret = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0);
- BUG_ON(!ret);
+ if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0)) {
+ dev_alert(dev,
+ "Grant still in use by backend domain\n");
+ queue->info->broken = true;
+ dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }

gnttab_release_grant_reference(&queue->gref_rx_head, ref);

@@ -1098,6 +1102,10 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struc
err = xennet_get_responses(queue, &rinfo, rp, &tmpq);

if (unlikely(err)) {
+ if (queue->info->broken) {
+ spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
err:
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmpq)))
__skb_queue_tail(&errq, skb);
@@ -1676,7 +1684,7 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
struct netfront_queue *queue, unsigned int feature_split_evtchn)
{
struct xen_netif_tx_sring *txs;
- struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs;
+ struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs = NULL;
grant_ref_t gref;
int err;

@@ -1696,21 +1704,21 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_

err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, txs, 1, &gref);
if (err < 0)
- goto grant_tx_ring_fail;
+ goto fail;
queue->tx_ring_ref = gref;

rxs = (struct xen_netif_rx_sring *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
if (!rxs) {
err = -ENOMEM;
xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "allocating rx ring page");
- goto alloc_rx_ring_fail;
+ goto fail;
}
SHARED_RING_INIT(rxs);
FRONT_RING_INIT(&queue->rx, rxs, XEN_PAGE_SIZE);

err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rxs, 1, &gref);
if (err < 0)
- goto grant_rx_ring_fail;
+ goto fail;
queue->rx_ring_ref = gref;

if (feature_split_evtchn)
@@ -1723,22 +1731,28 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
err = setup_netfront_single(queue);

if (err)
- goto alloc_evtchn_fail;
+ goto fail;

return 0;

/* If we fail to setup netfront, it is safe to just revoke access to
* granted pages because backend is not accessing it at this point.
*/
-alloc_evtchn_fail:
- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_rx_ring_fail:
- free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
-alloc_rx_ring_fail:
- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_tx_ring_fail:
- free_page((unsigned long)txs);
-fail:
+ fail:
+ if (queue->rx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+ gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0,
+ (unsigned long)rxs);
+ queue->rx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+ } else {
+ free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
+ }
+ if (queue->tx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+ gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0,
+ (unsigned long)txs);
+ queue->tx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+ } else {
+ free_page((unsigned long)txs);
+ }
return err;
}