Xiubo Li <xiubli@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
On 3/17/22 6:01 PM, Jeff Layton wrote:In my patchset (which I plan to send a new revision later today, I think I
I'm not sure we want to worry about .snap directories here since theyIf we don't take care of this. Then we don't know which snapshots should do
aren't "real". IIRC, snaps are inherited from parents too, so you could
do something like
mkdir dir1
mkdir dir1/.snap/snap1
mkdir dir1/dir2
fscrypt encrypt dir1/dir2
There should be nothing to prevent encrypting dir2, but I'm pretty sure
dir2/.snap will not be empty at that point.
encrypt/dencrypt and which shouldn't when building the path in lookup and when
reading the snapdir ?
still need to rebase it) this is handled by using the *real* snapshot
parent inode. If we're decrypting/encrypting a name for a snapshot that
starts with a '_' character, we first find the parent inode for that
snapshot and only do the operation if that parent is encrypted.
In the other email I suggested that we could prevent enabling encryption
in a directory when there are snapshots above in the hierarchy.
But now
that I think more about it, it won't solve any problem because you could
create those snapshots later and then you would still need to handle these
(non-encrypted) "_name_xxxx" snapshots anyway.
Cheers,