[PATCH 5.10 08/30] net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon Mar 21 2022 - 10:12:19 EST
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ]
syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]
Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631
CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
__sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
</TASK>
addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246
this frame has 1 object:
[32, 160) 'addr'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
^
ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index a31334b92be7..d0c95d7dd292 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2278,8 +2278,11 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
copy_skb = skb_get(skb);
skb_head = skb->data;
}
- if (copy_skb)
+ if (copy_skb) {
+ memset(&PACKET_SKB_CB(copy_skb)->sa.ll, 0,
+ sizeof(PACKET_SKB_CB(copy_skb)->sa.ll));
skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
+ }
}
snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
if ((int)snaplen < 0) {
@@ -3434,6 +3437,8 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (msg->msg_name) {
+ const size_t max_len = min(sizeof(skb->cb),
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
int copy_len;
/* If the address length field is there to be filled
@@ -3456,6 +3461,10 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
}
}
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(copy_len > max_len)) {
+ copy_len = max_len;
+ msg->msg_namelen = copy_len;
+ }
memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa, copy_len);
}
--
2.34.1