Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()

[Tyler Hicks]

On 2022-03-22 12:13:23, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
> errors.  This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.
> 
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> [1]
> Requested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> [1]
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjeW2r6Wv55Du0bJ@xxxxxx [1]
> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322111323.542184-2-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx

Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Tyler

> ---
> 
> Changes since v1:
> * Fix commit subject spelling spotted by David Woodhouse.
> * Reword one sentence as suggested by Paul Moore.
> * Add Reviewed-by Paul Moore.
> * Add Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen.
> ---
>  certs/blacklist.c | 9 +++++++++
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
> index 486ce0dd8e9c..25094ea73600 100644
> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
> @@ -307,6 +307,15 @@ static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
>  
>  /*
>   * Initialise the blacklist
> + *
> + * The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via
> + * device_initcall().  As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for
> + * any reason the kernel continues to execute.  While cleanly returning -ENODEV
> + * could be acceptable for some non-critical kernel parts, if the blacklist
> + * keyring fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for
> + * signed modules.  If a critical piece of security functionality that users
> + * expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right
> + * thing to do.
>   */
>  static int __init blacklist_init(void)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.35.1
>