Re: [PATCH 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate

[Pavel Machek]

Hi!

> > > One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory
> > > is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling
> > > encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel
> > > in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future
> > > optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted
> > > page data before the user key is available. This would remove the
> > > double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages
> > > loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer
> > > decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still
> > > knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in.
> >
> > Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big...
> >
> 
> As you know, with the way the snapshot mechanism works, a hibernation
> image can be at most 50% of RAM. If the system was using more than

There used to be 50% of RAM limit, but it was removed.

Best regards,
								Pavel
								
-- 
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.

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