[PATCH v7 000/102] KVM TDX basic feature support

From: isaku . yamahata
Date: Mon Jun 27 2022 - 17:55:10 EST

From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>

KVM TDX basic feature support

Hello. This is v7 the patch series vof KVM TDX support.
This is based on v5.19-rc1 + kvm/queue branch + TDX HOST patch series.
The tree can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream
How to run/test: It's describe at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM

Major changes from v6:
- rebased to v5.19 base

TODO:
- integrate fd-based guest memory. As the discussion is still on-going, I
intentionally dropped fd-based guest memory support yet. The integration can
be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream-workaround.
- 2M large page support. It's work-in-progress.
For large page support, there are several design choices. Here is the design options.
Any thoughts/feedback?

KVM MMU Large page support for TDX

* What needs to be done
- Track private or shared of each page size (4KB, 2MB, 1GB) based on
TDG.VP.VMCALL<MapGPA>. For large pages(2MB, 1GB), it can be mixed (some
lower-size pages are private and some shared.) In this case, the page can't
be large.
- if necessary, split large page on TDG.VP.VMCALL<MapGPA>
(split on dirty page tracking is future work)
- resolving KVM page fault
When resolving a private page and the page is large in the host, GPA can be
resolved as a large page in Secure-EPT. Even if the page is large on the host
side, sometimes a 4KB page can be resolved because it's up to guest TD to
accept at 4KB, 2MB, or 1GB.
- collapsing pages into a large page.
At this point, it's okay to not implement this. When dirty page tracking is
supported, this needs to be supported.
- On MapGPA, the page can be collapsed into a large page
- handle zapping SPTE and try to collapse the pages on the next KVM page fault
Unlike the EPT case, some trick is needed.
- For performance, optimize KVM page fault path at the cost of complicating
MapGPA path.

* options to track private or shared
At each page size (4KB, 2MB, and 1GB), track private, shared, or mixed (2MB and
1GB case). For 4KB each page, 1 bit per page is needed. private or shared. For
large pages (2MB and 1GB), 2 bits per large page is needed. (private, shared, or
mixed). When resolving KVM page fault, we don't want to check the lower-size
pages to check if the given GPA can be a large for performance. On MapGPA check
it instead.

Option A). enhance kvm_arch_memory_slot
enum kvm_page_type {
KVM_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID,
KVM_PAGE_TYPE_SHARED,
KVM_PAGE_TYPE_PRIVATE,
KVM_PAGE_TYPE_MIXED,
};

struct kvm_page_attr {
enum kvm_page_type type;
};

struct kvm_arch_memory_slot {
+ struct kvm_page_attr *page_attr[KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES];

Option B). steal one more bit SPTE_MIXED_MASK in addition to SPTE_SHARED_MASK
If !SPTE_MIXED_MASK, it can be large page.

Option C). use SPTE_SHARED_MASK and kvm_mmu_page::mixed bitmap
kvm_mmu_page::mixed bitmap of 1GB, root indicates mixed for 2MB, 1GB.


* comparison
A).
+ straightforward to implement
+ SPTE_SHARED_MASK isn't needed
- memory overhead compared to B). or C).
- more memory reference on KVM page fault

B).
+ simpler than C) (complex than A)?)
+ efficient on KVM page fault. (only SPTE reference)
+ low memory overhead
- Waste precious SPTE bits.

C).
+ efficient on KVM page fault. (only SPTE reference)
+ low memory overhead
- complicates MapGPA
- scattered data structure

Thanks,
Isaku Yamahata

Changes from v6:
- rebased to v5.19

Changes from v5:
- export __seamcall and use it
- move mutex lock from callee function of smp_call_on_cpu to the caller.
- rename mmu_prezap => flush_shadow_all_private() and tdx_mmu_release_hkid
- updated comment
- drop the use of tdh_mng_key.reclaimid(): as the function is for backward
compatibility to only return success
- struct kvm_tdx_cmd: metadata => flags, added __u64 error.
- make this ioctl systemwide ioctl
- ABI change to struct kvm_init_vm
- guest_tsc_khz: use kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz
- rename BUILD_BUG_ON_MEMCPY to MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE
- drop exporting kvm_set_tsc_khz().
- fix kvm_tdp_page_fault() for mtrr emulation
- rename it to kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), dropped kvm_gpa_shared_mask()
- drop kvm_is_private_gfn(), kept kvm_is_private_gpa()
keep kvm_{gfn, gpa}_private(), kvm_gpa_private()
- update commit message
- rename shadow_init_value => shadow_nonprsent_value
- added ept_violation_ve_test mode
- shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in tdp_mmu.c
- legacy MMU case
=> - mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(), kvm_mmu_create()
- FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
- #VE warning:
- rename: REMOVED_SPTE => __REMOVED_SPTE, SHADOW_REMOVED_SPTE => REMOVED_SPTE
- merge into Like we discussed, this patch should be merged with patch
"KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE".
- fix pointed by Sagi. check !is_private check => (kvm_gfn_shared_mask && !is_private)
- introduce kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, gfn)
- add only_shared argument to kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn()
- use kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported()
- rename SPTE_PRIVATE_PROHIBIT to SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
- rename: is_private_prohibit_spte() => spte_shared_mask()
- fix: shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in comment
- dropped this patch as the change was merged into kvm/queue
- update vt_apicv_post_state_restore()
- use is_64_bit_hypercall()
- comment: expand MSMI -> Machine Check System Management Interrupt
- fixed TDX_SEPT_PFERR
- tdvmcall_p[1234]_{write, read}() => tdvmcall_a[0123]_{read,write}()
- rename tdmvcall_exit_readon() => tdvmcall_leaf()
- remove optional zero check of argument.
- do a check for static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE)
in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi and __apic_accept_irq.
- WARN_ON_ONCE in tdx_smi_allowed and tdx_enable_smi_window.
- introduce vcpu_deliver_init to x86_ops
- sprinkeled KVM_BUG_ON()

Changes from v4:
- rebased to TDX host kernel patch series.
- include all the patches to make this patch series working.
- add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear.

---
* What's TDX?
TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines
Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust
Domain (TD) for confidential computing.

A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its
memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.

We have more detailed explanations below (***).
We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****).

In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the
current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.


* The organization of this patch series
This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support":
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx/

this patch series is available at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/releases/tag/kvm-upstream
The corresponding patches to qemu are available at
https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx/commits/tdx-upstream

The relations of the layers are depicted as follows.
The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have.

The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can
exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM,
create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle
vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.

TDX vcpu
interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\
^ |
| |
TD finalization |
^ |
| |
TDX EPT violation<------------\ |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu enter/exit | |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
^ | ^
| | |
TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks
^ ^
| |
TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
^ ^
| |
TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
coexistence support


The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit
that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where
each layer starts.

TDX host kernel support:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx/
The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an
independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions
this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.

TDX, VMX coexistence:
Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the
initialization of the TDX module.
This layer starts with
"KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
TDX architectural definitions:
Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
TD VM creation/destruction:
Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
TD vcpu creation/destruction:
guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
TDX EPT violation:
Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle
secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
TD vcpu enter/exit:
Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before
entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so
that TD vcpu can continue running.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"

KVM MMU GPA shared bit:
Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX
repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared,
it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared
guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest
page is encrypted.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT
entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
KVM TDP MMU hooks:
Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT
access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike
conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead,
use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
KVM TDP MMU MapGPA:
Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/shared
to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned to a
private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall,
guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to shared (or
private).
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA "

KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram)
[PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395
Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. The
patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM.

(***)
* TDX module
A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to implement
the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be
loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assume
that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized.

The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon the
new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the VMX
architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation mode,
and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL
instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand
(leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. TDX
non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root
operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure that
no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and state.

TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation include TD
Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root to
TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external
event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be
synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function.

TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER is one
of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Trust
Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into
various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module management),
MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private memory),
etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information.

TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a guest
TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high
level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole,
execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR
bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the
same value for all VCPUs of the same TD.

Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a
TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds
the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and
DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as
TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures,
such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc.

Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt
descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control
structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.

The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to
define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3)
Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".

*TD Private Memory
TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
encryption keys.

In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical
address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME
accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared
HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.

During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
(Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host
VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as
with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange
needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT
functionality even for TDs.

* Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private
key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX
interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why
"subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time
than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the
Secure EPT for the TD.

This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface
functions.

* VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For
example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy
the initial image to private memory.

* TSC Virtualization
The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values
(e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined
by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM
owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.

* MCE support for TDs
The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD
to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs
related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by
paravirtualizing MSR access.

[1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
available.

* Restrictions or future work
Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are
addressed as future independent patch series.
- large page (2M, 1G)
- qemu gdb stub
- guest PMU
- and more

* Prerequisites
It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope
of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is
planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX
module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest
life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.

Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global
configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done.
The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module
specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine

** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
(HKID) assigned to guest TD.
The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
- int seamrr_enabled()
Check if required cpu feature (SEAM mode) is available. This only check CPU
feature availability. At this point, the TDX module may not be ready for KVM
to use.
- int init_tdx(void);
Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
- const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
isn't initialized.
- u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void);
Return global key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
- int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
Allocate HKID for guest TD.
- void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
Free HKID for guest TD.

(****)
* TDX KVM high-level design
- Host key ID management
Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption.
It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions,
u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).

- Data structures and VM type
Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct
kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To
identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or
TDX, is used.

- VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations.
New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU
parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.

The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the
conventional VM creation.
- Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
- VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
- New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
- New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
- VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
- New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
- New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with
the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
- New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial
TDX VM contents.
- VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)

- Protected guest state
Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM
can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting
exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as
silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via
KVM API ioctls.

VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations.
Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect
operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".

Operations on the CPU state
silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to
CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.

. ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
. TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back
out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
. dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
. exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore

Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.

- KVM MMU integration
One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if
the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is
set). The bits are called stolen bits.

- Stolen bits framework
systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is
used.

- Shared EPT and secure EPT
There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure
EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen
bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve
EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA.
Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with
SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private
EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at
the cost of extra memory.

The following depicts the relationship.

KVM | TDX module
| | |
-------------+---------- | |
| | | |
V V | |
shared GPA private GPA | |
CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
| | | |
| | | |
V V | V
shared EPT private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT
| | | |
| \--------------------+------\ |
| | | |
V | V V
shared guest page | private guest page
|
|
non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
|

- Operating on Secure EPT
Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API
during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring
it to TDX backend.

* References

[1] TDX specification
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
[2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
[4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
[5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
[6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
[8] intel public github
kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
[9] TDVF
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2

Chao Gao (3):
KVM: x86: Move check_processor_compatibility from init ops to runtime
ops
Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional
arch funcs"
KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
wrmsr

Isaku Yamahata (72):
KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialiization
x86/virt/vmx/tdx: export platform_tdx_enabled()
KVM: TDX: Detect CPU feature on kernel module initialization
KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about
TDX module
KVM: TDX: Initialize TDX module when loading kvm_intel.ko
KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
definitions
KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction
x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id
KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
creation/destruction
KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
KVM: x86/mmu: Focibly use TDP MMU for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs
KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD
KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
KVM: x86/mmu: steal software usable git to record if GFN is for shared
or not
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu
KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
exits/interrupts/hypercalls
KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
behavior
KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c
KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls
(TDG.VP.VMCALL)
KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall
KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI
Documentation/virtual/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU

Rick Edgecombe (1):
KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bits

Sean Christopherson (25):
KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization
KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from
confidential VMs
KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly check for MMIO spte in fast page fault
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only leaf SPTEs for deleted/moved memslot for
private mmu
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX
KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC
KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced
KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
argument
KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

Xiaoyao Li (1):
KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 30 +-
.../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 33 +
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 381 +++
Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 466 ++++
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 2 +-
arch/mips/kvm/mips.c | 14 +-
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 2 +-
arch/riscv/kvm/main.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 10 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 56 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 67 +
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 14 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 95 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 +
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 37 +-
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 42 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 360 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 123 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 46 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 65 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 690 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 12 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 13 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 174 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1071 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 39 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 43 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 13 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2465 +++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 275 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 157 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 29 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 22 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 188 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 146 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 737 ++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 39 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 235 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 148 +-
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 2 +
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 54 +-
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 52 -
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 +-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 95 +
tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 67 +-
59 files changed, 7877 insertions(+), 804 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h

--
2.25.1