Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request in truncate_inode_partial_folio

[Mike Rapoport]

On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 09:30:12AM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 9:41 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 03:59:26PM -0700, syzbot wrote:
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > syzbot found the following issue on:
> > >
> > > HEAD commit:    941e3e791269 Merge tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org..
> > > git tree:       upstream
> > > console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1670ded4080000
> > > kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=833001d0819ddbc9
> > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4
> > > compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> > > syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=140f9ba8080000
> > > C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=15495188080000
> > >
> > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >
> > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005
> > > #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
> > > #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
> > > PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060
> > > Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> > > CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0
> > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> > > RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64
> > > Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
> > > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202
> > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb
> > > RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005
> > > RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005
> > > R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005
> > > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb
> > > FS:  00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > > CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
> > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > > Call Trace:
> > >  <TASK>
> > >  zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline]
> > >  folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline]
> > >  truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237
> > >  truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381
> > >  truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline]
> > >  truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753
> > >  simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535
> > >  secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170
> > >  notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424
> > >  do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65
> > >  do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193
> > >  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> > >  do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> > >  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
> > > RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899
> > > Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> > > RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d
> > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899
> > > RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003
> > > RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c
> > > R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000
> > >  </TASK>
> > > Modules linked in:
> > > CR2: ffff888021f7e005
> > > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> >
> > I think this is a bug in memfd_secret.  secretmem_setattr() can race with a page
> > being faulted in by secretmem_fault().  Specifically, a page can be faulted in
> > after secretmem_setattr() has set i_size but before it zeroes out the partial
> > page past i_size.  memfd_secret pages aren't mapped in the kernel direct map, so
> > the crash occurs when the kernel tries to zero out the partial page.
> >
> > I don't know what the best solution is -- maybe a rw_semaphore protecting
> > secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr()?  Or perhaps secretmem_setattr()
> > should avoid the call to truncate_setsize() by not using simple_setattr(), given
> > that secretmem_setattr() only supports the size going from zero to nonzero.
> 
> From my perspective the rw_semaphore approach sounds reasonable.
> 
> simple_setattr() and the functions it calls to do the actual work
> isn't a tiny amount of code, it would be a shame to reimplement it in
> secretmem.c.
> 
> For the rwsem, I guess the idea is setattr will take it for write, and
> fault will take it for read? Since setattr is a very infrequent
> operation - a typical use case is you'd do it exactly once right after
> opening the memfd_secret - this seems like it wouldn't make fault
> significantly less performant. It's also a pretty small change I
> think, just a few lines.
 
Below is my take on adding a semaphore and making ->setattr() and ->fault()
mutually exclusive. It's only lightly tested so I'd appreciate if Eric
could give it a whirl.

With addition of semaphore to secretmem_setattr() it seems we don't need
special care for size changes, just calling simple_setattr() after taking
the semaphore should be fine. Thoughts?