Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: Don't redirect packets with invalid pkt_len

From: Daniel Borkmann
Date: Tue Jul 12 2022 - 16:12:31 EST


On 7/12/22 6:58 PM, sdf@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
On 07/12, Zhengchao Shao wrote:
Syzbot found an issue [1]: fq_codel_drop() try to drop a flow whitout any
skbs, that is, the flow->head is null.
The root cause, as the [2] says, is because that bpf_prog_test_run_skb()
run a bpf prog which redirects empty skbs.
So we should determine whether the length of the packet modified by bpf
prog or others like bpf_prog_test is valid before forwarding it directly.

LINK: [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0b84da80c2917757915afa89f7738a9d16ec96c5
LINK: [2] https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg777503.html

Reported-by: syzbot+7a12909485b94426aceb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  net/core/filter.c | 9 ++++++++-
  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 4ef77ec5255e..27801b314960 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -2122,6 +2122,11 @@ static int __bpf_redirect_no_mac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
  {
      unsigned int mlen = skb_network_offset(skb);

+    if (unlikely(skb->len == 0)) {
+        kfree_skb(skb);
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+
      if (mlen) {
          __skb_pull(skb, mlen);

@@ -2143,7 +2148,9 @@ static int __bpf_redirect_common(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
                   u32 flags)
  {
      /* Verify that a link layer header is carried */
-    if (unlikely(skb->mac_header >= skb->network_header)) {
+    if (unlikely(skb->mac_header >= skb->network_header) ||
+        (min_t(u32, skb_mac_header_len(skb), skb->len) <
+         (u32)dev->min_header_len)) {

Why check skb->len != 0 above but skb->len < dev->min_header_len here?
I guess it doesn't make sense in __bpf_redirect_no_mac because we know
that mac is empty, but why do we care in __bpf_redirect_common?
Why not put this check in the common __bpf_redirect?

Also, it's still not clear to me whether we should bake it into the core
stack vs having some special checks from test_prog_run only. I'm
assuming the issue is that we can construct illegal skbs with that
test_prog_run interface, so maybe start by fixing that?

Agree, ideally we can prevent it right at the source rather than adding
more tests into the fast-path.

Did you have a chance to look at the reproducer more closely? What
exactly is it doing?

          kfree_skb(skb);
          return -ERANGE;
      }
--
2.17.1