Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] x86/mm/cpa: restore global bit when page is present

[Lu, Aaron]

On Thu, 2022-08-11 at 05:21 +0000, Hyeonggon Yoo wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 08, 2022 at 10:56:46PM +0800, Aaron Lu wrote:
> > For configs that don't have PTI enabled or cpus that don't need
> > meltdown mitigation, current kernel can lose GLOBAL bit after a page
> > goes through a cycle of present -> not present -> present.
> > 
> > It happened like this(__vunmap() does this in vm_remove_mappings()):
> > original page protection: 0x8000000000000163 (NX/G/D/A/RW/P)
> > set_memory_np(page, 1):   0x8000000000000062 (NX/D/A/RW) lose G and P
> > set_memory_p(pagem 1):    0x8000000000000063 (NX/D/A/RW/P) restored P
> > 
> > In the end, this page's protection no longer has Global bit set and this
> > would create problem for this merge small mapping feature.
> > 
> > For this reason, restore Global bit for systems that do not have PTI
> > enabled if page is present.
> > 
> > (pgprot_clear_protnone_bits() deserves a better name if this patch is
> > acceptible but first, I would like to get some feedback if this is the
> > right way to solve this so I didn't bother with the name yet)
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@xxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 ++
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> > index 1abd5438f126..33657a54670a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> > @@ -758,6 +758,8 @@ static pgprot_t pgprot_clear_protnone_bits(pgprot_t prot)
> >  	 */
> >  	if (!(pgprot_val(prot) & _PAGE_PRESENT))
> >  		pgprot_val(prot) &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
> > +	else
> > +		pgprot_val(prot) |= _PAGE_GLOBAL & __default_kernel_pte_mask;
> >  
> >  	return prot;
> >  }
> 
> IIUC It makes it unable to set _PAGE_GLOBL when PTI is on.
> 

Yes. Is this a problem?
I think that is the intended behaviour when PTI is on: not to enable
Gloabl bit on kernel mappings.

> Maybe it would be less intrusive to make
> set_direct_map_default_noflush() replace protection bits
> with PAGE_KENREL as it's only called for direct map, and the function
> is to reset permission to default:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index 1abd5438f126..0dd4433c1382 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -2250,7 +2250,16 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
> 
>  int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
>  {
> -       return __set_pages_p(page, 1);
> +       unsigned long tempaddr = (unsigned long) page_address(page);
> +       struct cpa_data cpa = {
> +                       .vaddr = &tempaddr,
> +                       .pgd = NULL,
> +                       .numpages = 1,
> +                       .mask_set = PAGE_KERNEL,
> +                       .mask_clr = __pgprot(~0),
> +                       .flags = 0};
> +
> +       return __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0);
>  }

Looks reasonable to me and it is indeed less intrusive. I'm only
concerned there might be other paths that also go through present ->
not present -> present and this change can not cover them.

> 
> set_direct_map_{invalid,default}_noflush() is the exact reason
> why direct map become split after vmalloc/vfree with special
> permissions.

Yes I agree, because it can lose G bit after the whole cycle when PTI
is not on. When PTI is on, there is no such problem because G bit is
not there initially.

Thanks,
Aaron