Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms

[Daniel Kiper]

On Thu, Aug 11, 2022 at 07:25:58PM +0930, Brendan Trotter wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Thu, Aug 11, 2022 at 3:16 AM Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 10, 2022 at 06:37:18PM +0930, Brendan Trotter wrote:
> >
> > > [1] doesn't provide any useful information. How does a kernel know
> > > that the callback provided by boot loader actually measures what it's
> > > supposed to measure, or even does anything at all?
> >
> > The kernel has no way to know this - *any* code you've run before
> > performing a measurement could tamper with the kernel such that it
> > believes it's fine. This is just as true in DRTM as it is in SRTM. But
> > you know what the expected measurements should be, so you're able to
> > either seal secrets to those PCR values or rely on remote attestation.
>
> In this scenario the kernel has no idea what the measurement should
> be, it only knows the measurement that a potentially malicious boot
> loader felt like giving the kernel previously (e.g. when the kernel
> was installed).
>
> > > [1] doesn't provide any useful information. Senter and skinit don't
> > > provide a method for kernel to detect that (e.g.) a MiTM boot loader
> > > has always measured a forgery and has changed unmeasured code in a
> > > different way every time you boot.
> >
> > Measurements are not opaque objects. If you're not able to reconstruct
> > the expected measurement then you're doing it wrong.
>
> OK; so to detect if boot loader has always given kernel a bad/forged
> measurement; the kernel repeats all of the steps involved in creating
> the measurement itself exactly the same as the boot loader should have
> (but might not have) so that kernel can compare a "known
> good/trustworthy" measurement with the useless measurement that the
> boot loader created for no sane reason whatsoever?

Could you tell us where exactly boot loader creates measurements for the DRTM?

Daniel