[PATCH 5.4 51/77] x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Fri Sep 02 2022 - 08:37:39 EST

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From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 7df548840c496b0141fb2404b889c346380c2b22 upstream.

Older Intel CPUs that are not in the affected processor list for MMIO
Stale Data vulnerabilities currently report "Not affected" in sysfs,
which may not be correct. Vulnerability status for these older CPUs is
unknown.

Add known-not-affected CPUs to the whitelist. Report "unknown"
mitigation status for CPUs that are not in blacklist, whitelist and also
don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits that reflect hardware
immunity to MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.

Mitigation is not deployed when the status is unknown.

[ bp: Massage, fixup. ]

Fixes: 8d50cdf8b834 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data")
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a932c154772f2121794a5f2eded1a11013114711.1657846269.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 14 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 40 ++++++----
4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
@@ -230,6 +230,20 @@ The possible values in this file are:
* - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
- The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
enabled.
+ * - 'Unknown: No mitigations'
+ - The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is
+ out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted.
+
+Definitions:
+------------
+
+Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to
+Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU)
+process or other similar mechanisms.
+
+End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no
+longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update
+processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter.

If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
the above information:
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(26) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */

#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -396,7 +396,8 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio
u64 ia32_cap;

if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
- cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
}
@@ -501,6 +502,8 @@ out:
pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
}

static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -1880,6 +1883,9 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_stat

static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+
if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);

@@ -2007,6 +2013,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
return srbds_show_state(buf);

case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);

default:
@@ -2063,6 +2070,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *de

ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+ else
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7)
#define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8)
#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(9)
+#define NO_MMIO BIT(10)

#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -1046,6 +1047,11 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),

/* Intel Family 6 */
+ VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO),
+
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
@@ -1064,9 +1070,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP, NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),

- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),

/*
* Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -1081,18 +1087,18 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),

/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),

/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),

/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
- VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2),
- VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2),
+ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_MMIO),
{}
};

@@ -1234,10 +1240,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
* Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
* but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
* not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ *
+ * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
+ * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
*/
- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
- !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+ }

if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&

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