[PATCH 5.15 027/107] tcp: annotate data-race around challenge_timestamp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit 8c70521238b7863c2af607e20bcba20f974c969b ]

challenge_timestamp can be read an written by concurrent threads.

This was expected, but we need to annotate the race to avoid potential issues.

Following patch moves challenge_timestamp and challenge_count
to per-netns storage to provide better isolation.

Fixes: 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index a33e6aa42a4c5..7fd7e7cba0c92 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -3623,11 +3623,11 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	/* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
 	now = jiffies / HZ;
-	if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
+	if (now != READ_ONCE(challenge_timestamp)) {
 		u32 ack_limit = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
 		u32 half = (ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
 
-		challenge_timestamp = now;
+		WRITE_ONCE(challenge_timestamp, now);
 		WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, half + prandom_u32_max(ack_limit));
 	}
 	count = READ_ONCE(challenge_count);
-- 
2.35.1