[PATCH 2/2] tracing: Fix reading strings from synthetic events

From: Steven Rostedt
Date: Tue Oct 11 2022 - 17:27:26 EST


From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>

The follow commands caused a crash:

# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 's:open char file[]' > dynamic_events
# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:file=filename:onchange($file).trace(open,$file)' > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/trigger'
# echo 1 > events/synthetic/open/enable

BOOM!

The problem is that the synthetic event field "char file[]" will read
the value given to it as a string without any memory checks to make sure
the address is valid. The above example will pass in the user space
address and the sythetic event code will happily call strlen() on it
and then strscpy() where either one will cause an oops when accessing
user space addresses.

Use the helper functions from trace_kprobe and trace_eprobe that can
read strings safely (and actually succeed when the address is from user
space and the memory is mapped in).

Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: bd82631d7ccdc ("tracing: Add support for dynamic strings to synthetic events")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
index 5e8c07aef071..eae15bde883d 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
/* for gfp flag names */
#include <linux/trace_events.h>
#include <trace/events/mmflags.h>
+#include "trace_probe.h"
+#include "trace_probe_kernel.h"

#include "trace_synth.h"

@@ -409,6 +411,7 @@ static unsigned int trace_string(struct synth_trace_event *entry,
{
unsigned int len = 0;
char *str_field;
+ int ret;

if (is_dynamic) {
u32 data_offset;
@@ -417,19 +420,28 @@ static unsigned int trace_string(struct synth_trace_event *entry,
data_offset += event->n_u64 * sizeof(u64);
data_offset += data_size;

- str_field = (char *)entry + data_offset;
-
- len = strlen(str_val) + 1;
- strscpy(str_field, str_val, len);
-
+ len = kern_fetch_store_strlen(str_val) + 1;
+ if (len == 1)
+ len = strlen("fault") + 1;
data_offset |= len << 16;
*(u32 *)&entry->fields[*n_u64] = data_offset;

+ kern_fetch_store_string((unsigned long)str_val, &entry->fields[*n_u64], entry);
+
(*n_u64)++;
} else {
str_field = (char *)&entry->fields[*n_u64];

- strscpy(str_field, str_val, STR_VAR_LEN_MAX);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+ if ((unsigned long)str_val < TASK_SIZE)
+ ret = strncpy_from_user_nofault(str_field, str_val, STR_VAR_LEN_MAX);
+ else
+#endif
+ ret = strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(str_field, str_val, STR_VAR_LEN_MAX);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ strcpy(str_field, "(fault)");
+
(*n_u64) += STR_VAR_LEN_MAX / sizeof(u64);
}

@@ -462,7 +474,9 @@ static notrace void trace_event_raw_event_synth(void *__data,
val_idx = var_ref_idx[field_pos];
str_val = (char *)(long)var_ref_vals[val_idx];

- len = strlen(str_val) + 1;
+ len = kern_fetch_store_strlen(str_val) + 1;
+ if (len == 1)
+ len = strlen("(fault)") + 1;

fields_size += len;
}
--
2.35.1