Re: [PATCH] 9p: fix crash when transaction killed

[Schspa Shi]

Schspa Shi <schspa@xxxxxxxxx> writes:

> asmadeus@xxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>
>> Schspa Shi wrote on Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 12:22:51AM +0800:
>>> The transport layer of fs does not fully support the cancel request.
>>> When the request is in the REQ_STATUS_SENT state, p9_fd_cancelled
>>> will forcibly delete the request, and at this time p9_[read/write]_work
>>> may continue to use the request. Therefore, it causes UAF .
>>> 
>>> There is the logs from syzbot.
>>> 
>>> Corrupted memory at 0xffff88807eade00b [ 0xff 0x07 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
>>> 0x00 0x00 . . . . . . . . ] (in kfence-#110):
>>>  p9_fcall_fini net/9p/client.c:248 [inline]
>>>  p9_req_put net/9p/client.c:396 [inline]
>>>  p9_req_put+0x208/0x250 net/9p/client.c:390
>>>  p9_client_walk+0x247/0x540 net/9p/client.c:1165
>>>  clone_fid fs/9p/fid.h:21 [inline]
>>>  v9fs_fid_xattr_set+0xe4/0x2b0 fs/9p/xattr.c:118
>>>  v9fs_xattr_set fs/9p/xattr.c:100 [inline]
>>>  v9fs_xattr_handler_set+0x6f/0x120 fs/9p/xattr.c:159
>>>  __vfs_setxattr+0x119/0x180 fs/xattr.c:182
>>>  __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x129/0x5f0 fs/xattr.c:216
>>>  __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1d3/0x260 fs/xattr.c:277
>>>  vfs_setxattr+0x143/0x340 fs/xattr.c:309
>>>  setxattr+0x146/0x160 fs/xattr.c:617
>>>  path_setxattr+0x197/0x1c0 fs/xattr.c:636
>>>  __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:652 [inline]
>>>  __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:648 [inline]
>>>  __ia32_sys_setxattr+0xc0/0x160 fs/xattr.c:648
>>>  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
>>>  __do_fast_syscall_32+0x65/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
>>>  do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
>>>  entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
>>> 
>>> Below is a similar scenario, the scenario in the syzbot log looks more
>>> complicated than this one, but the root cause seems to be the same.
>>> 
>>>      T21124               p9_write_work        p9 read_work
>>> ======================== first trans =================================
>>> p9_client_walk
>>>   p9_client_rpc
>>>     p9_client_prepare_req
>>>     /* req->refcount == 2 */
>>>     c->trans_mod->request(c, req);
>>>       p9_fd_request
>>>         req move to unsent_req_list
>>>                             req->status = REQ_STATUS_SENT;
>>>                             req move to req_list
>>>                             << send to server >>
>>>     wait_event_killable
>>>     << get kill signal >>
>>>     if (c->trans_mod->cancel(c, req))
>>>        p9_client_flush(c, req);
>>>          /* send flush request */
>>>          req = p9_client_rpc(c, P9_TFLUSH, "w", oldtag);
>>> 		 if (c->trans_mod->cancelled)
>>>             c->trans_mod->cancelled(c, oldreq);
>>>               /* old req was deleted from req_list */
>>>               /* req->refcount == 1 */
>>>   p9_req_put
>>>     /* req->refcount == 0 */
>>>     << preempted >>
>>>                                        << get response, UAF here >>
>>>                                        m->rreq = p9_tag_lookup(m->client, m->rc.tag);
>>>                                          /* req->refcount == 1 */
>>>                                        << do response >>
>>>                                        p9_client_cb(m->client, m->rreq, REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
>>>                                          /* req->refcount == 0 */
>>>                                          p9_fcall_fini
>>>                                          /* request have been freed */
>>>     p9_fcall_fini
>>>      /* double free */
>>>                                        p9_req_put(m->client, m->rreq);
>>>                                          /* req->refcount == 1 */
>>> 
>>> To fix it, we can wait the request with status REQ_STATUS_SENT returned.
>>
>> Christian replied on this (we cannot wait) but I agree with him -- the
>
> Yes, this is where I worry about too, this wait maybe cause a deadlock.
>

@Christian: It seems we don't need this wait, The problem maybe cause by
lack of lock in p9_tag_lookup.

>> scenario you describe is proteced by p9_tag_lookup checking for refcount
>> with refcount_inc_not_zero (p9_req_try_get).
>
> Thanks for pointing out the zero value check here, the scene in the
> commit message does not hold.
>
>>
>> The normal scenarii for flush are as follow:
>>  - cancel before request is sent: no flush, just free
>>  - flush is ignored and reply comes first: we get reply from original
>> request then reply from flush
>>  - flush is handled and reply never comes: we only get reply from flush
>>
>> Protocol-wise, we can safely reuse the tag after the flush reply got
>> received; and as far as I can follow the code we only ever free the tag
>> (last p9_call_fini) after flush has returned so the entry should be
>> protected.
>>
>> If we receive a response on the given tag between cancelled and the main
>> thread going out the request has been marked as FLSHD and should be
>> ignored. . . here is one p9_req_put in p9_read_work() in this case but
>> it corresponds to the ref obtained by p9_tag_lookup() so it should be
>> valid.
>>
>>
>> I'm happy to believe we have a race somewhere (even if no sane server
>> would produce it), but right now I don't see it looking at the code.. :/
>
> And I think there is a race too. because the syzbot report about 9p fs
> memory corruption multi times.
>
> As for the problem, the p9_tag_lookup only takes the rcu_read_lock when
> accessing the IDR, why it doesn't take the p9_client->lock? Maybe the
> root cause is that a lock is missing here.

Add Christian Schoenebeck for bad mail address typo.

-- 
BRs
Schspa Shi