Re: [PATCH v5 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use

[Casey Schaufler]

On 11/30/2022 12:22 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 11:41:26AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> Good afternoon, I hope the week is going well for everyone.
>
>> On Sun, 2022-11-27 at 18:33 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 12:11:20PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 2022-11-11 at 15:16 -0800, Evan Green wrote:
>>>>> Introduce a new Kconfig, TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR, which if enabled
>>>>> restricts usermode's ability to extend or reset PCR 23.
>>>> Could I re ask the question here that I asked of Matthew's patch
>>>> set:
>>>>
>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/b0c4980c8fad14115daa3040979c52f07f7fbe2c.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/
>>>>
>>>> Which was could we use an NVRAM index in the TPM instead of a PCR???
>>>> The reason for asking was that PCRs are rather precious and might
>>>> get more so now that Lennart has some grand scheme for using more
>>>> of them in his unified boot project.?? Matthew promised to play with
>>>> the idea but never got back to the patch set to say whether he
>>>> investigated this or not.
>>> Even for PCR case it would be better to have it configurable through
>>> kernel command-line, including a disabled state, which would the
>>> default.
>>>
>>> This would be backwards compatible, and if designed properly, could
>>> more easily extended for NV index later on.
>> Um how?  The observation is in the above referenced email is that PCR23
>> is reserved in the TCG literature for application usage.  If any
>> application is actually using PCR23 based on that spec then revoking
>> access to user space will cause it to break.  This is an ABI change
>> which is not backwards compatible.  You can call it a distro problem if
>> it's command line configurable, but the default would be what most
>> distros take, so it's rather throwing them under the bus if there is an
>> application using it.
>>
>> Of course, if no application is actually using PCR23, then it's
>> probably OK to use it in the kernel and make it invisible to user
>> space, but no evidence about this has actually been presented.
> If there isn't, there will be in in the next week or so, if we can
> stay on schedule.  Otherwise, I fear that Casey Schaufler, who I
> believe is holding his breath, may turn irretrievably blue.... :-)

Sorry to disappoint, but my supply of apoplexy is firmly rooted elsewhere
for the time being. :-( Also, you overestimate my interest in things
TPM related.

> The Trust Orchestration System, Quixote, that we are releasing for
> Linux uses PCR23 to generate an attestation of the functional state
> value for an internally modeled security domain.
>
> TSEM, the LSM based kernel component in all of this, supports the
> ability to implement multiple 'domains', nee namespaces, each of which
> can have a security modeling function attached to it.  Each internally
> modeled domain has to have the ability to independently attest the
> functional value of the security model implemented for the
> domain/namespace.

I am very interested to see TSEM. I have heard nothing of it to date.

> We have found, and I believe others will find that, particularly the
> resettable registers, are too precious to be constrained from general
> usage.  We actually just finished lifting the PCR23 extension
> functionality out of the TSEM driver and into userspace because having
> it in the kernel was too constraining.
>
> With respect to making the behavior a command-line option.  We've
> slogged through 2+ years of conversations with sizable players who
> have indicated that if the 'distys' don't implement something, it
> isn't a relevant Linux technology, so a command-line option poses a
> barrier to innovation.
>
>> James
> Have a good day.
>
> As always,
> Dr. Greg
>
> The Quixote Project - Flailing at the Travails of Cybersecurity