Re: [PATCH v10 3/9] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory

From: Fuad Tabba
Date: Mon Dec 05 2022 - 04:05:17 EST


Hi Chao,

On Fri, Dec 2, 2022 at 6:18 AM Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> In memory encryption usage, guest memory may be encrypted with special
> key and can be accessed only by the guest itself. We call such memory
> private memory. It's valueless and sometimes can cause problem to allow
> userspace to access guest private memory. This new KVM memslot extension
> allows guest private memory being provided through a restrictedmem
> backed file descriptor(fd) and userspace is restricted to access the
> bookmarked memory in the fd.
>
> This new extension, indicated by the new flag KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, adds two
> additional KVM memslot fields restricted_fd/restricted_offset to allow
> userspace to instruct KVM to provide guest memory through restricted_fd.
> 'guest_phys_addr' is mapped at the restricted_offset of restricted_fd
> and the size is 'memory_size'.
>
> The extended memslot can still have the userspace_addr(hva). When use, a
> single memslot can maintain both private memory through restricted_fd
> and shared memory through userspace_addr. Whether the private or shared
> part is visible to guest is maintained by other KVM code.
>
> A restrictedmem_notifier field is also added to the memslot structure to
> allow the restricted_fd's backing store to notify KVM the memory change,
> KVM then can invalidate its page table entries or handle memory errors.
>
> Together with the change, a new config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM is added
> and right now it is selected on X86_64 only.
>
> To make future maintenance easy, internally use a binary compatible
> alias struct kvm_user_mem_region to handle both the normal and the
> '_ext' variants.
>
> Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@xxxxxxxxxx>

V9 of this patch [*] had KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM, but it's not in this
patch series anymore. Any reason you removed it, or is it just an
omission?

[*] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20221025151344.3784230-3-chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/

Thanks,
/fuad

> ---
> Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/kvm_host.h | 8 ++++--
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
> virt/kvm/Kconfig | 3 +++
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 7 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> index bb2f709c0900..99352170c130 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry.
> :Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY
> :Architectures: all
> :Type: vm ioctl
> -:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region (in)
> +:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region(_ext) (in)
> :Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
>
> ::
> @@ -1332,9 +1332,18 @@ yet and must be cleared on entry.
> __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */
> };
>
> + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext {
> + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region;
> + __u64 restricted_offset;
> + __u32 restricted_fd;
> + __u32 pad1;
> + __u64 pad2[14];
> + };
> +
> /* for kvm_memory_region::flags */
> #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0)
> #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1)
> + #define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2)
>
> This ioctl allows the user to create, modify or delete a guest physical
> memory slot. Bits 0-15 of "slot" specify the slot id and this value
> @@ -1365,12 +1374,29 @@ It is recommended that the lower 21 bits of guest_phys_addr and userspace_addr
> be identical. This allows large pages in the guest to be backed by large
> pages in the host.
>
> -The flags field supports two flags: KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES and
> -KVM_MEM_READONLY. The former can be set to instruct KVM to keep track of
> -writes to memory within the slot. See KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl to know how to
> -use it. The latter can be set, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM capability allows it,
> -to make a new slot read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be
> -posted to userspace as KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits.
> +kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext struct includes all fields of
> +kvm_userspace_memory_region struct, while also adds additional fields for some
> +other features. See below description of flags field for more information.
> +It's recommended to use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext in new userspace code.
> +
> +The flags field supports following flags:
> +
> +- KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES to instruct KVM to keep track of writes to memory
> + within the slot. For more details, see KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl.
> +
> +- KVM_MEM_READONLY, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM allows, to make a new slot
> + read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be posted to userspace as
> + KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits.
> +
> +- KVM_MEM_PRIVATE, if KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE is supported (see
> + KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl), to indicate a new slot has private
> + memory backed by a file descriptor(fd) and userspace access to the fd may be
> + restricted. Userspace should use restricted_fd/restricted_offset in the
> + kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext to instruct KVM to provide private memory
> + to guest. Userspace should guarantee not to map the same host physical address
> + indicated by restricted_fd/restricted_offset to different guest physical
> + addresses within multiple memslots. Failed to do this may result undefined
> + behavior.
>
> When the KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU capability is available, changes in the backing of
> the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index a8e379a3afee..690cb21010e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ config KVM
> select INTERVAL_TREE
> select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
> select HAVE_KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> + select HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM if X86_64
> + select RESTRICTEDMEM if HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM
> help
> Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware
> virtualization extensions. You will need a fairly recent
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 7f850dfb4086..9a07380f8d3c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12224,7 +12224,7 @@ void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa,
> }
>
> for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
> - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m;
> + struct kvm_user_mem_region m;
>
> m.slot = id | (i << 16);
> m.flags = 0;
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index a784e2b06625..02347e386ea2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
>
> #include <asm/kvm_host.h>
> #include <linux/kvm_dirty_ring.h>
> +#include <linux/restrictedmem.h>
>
> #ifndef KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS
> #define KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS KVM_MAX_VCPUS
> @@ -585,6 +586,9 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {
> u32 flags;
> short id;
> u16 as_id;
> + struct file *restricted_file;
> + loff_t restricted_offset;
> + struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier;
> };
>
> static inline bool kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> @@ -1123,9 +1127,9 @@ enum kvm_mr_change {
> };
>
> int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem);
> + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem);
> int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem);
> + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem);
> void kvm_arch_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
> void kvm_arch_memslots_updated(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen);
> int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 5d0941acb5bb..13bff963b8b0 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -103,6 +103,33 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region {
> __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */
> };
>
> +struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext {
> + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region;
> + __u64 restricted_offset;
> + __u32 restricted_fd;
> + __u32 pad1;
> + __u64 pad2[14];
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef __KERNEL__
> +/*
> + * kvm_user_mem_region is a kernel-only alias of kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext
> + * that "unpacks" kvm_userspace_memory_region so that KVM can directly access
> + * all fields from the top-level "extended" region.
> + */
> +struct kvm_user_mem_region {
> + __u32 slot;
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u64 guest_phys_addr;
> + __u64 memory_size;
> + __u64 userspace_addr;
> + __u64 restricted_offset;
> + __u32 restricted_fd;
> + __u32 pad1;
> + __u64 pad2[14];
> +};
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * The bit 0 ~ bit 15 of kvm_memory_region::flags are visible for userspace,
> * other bits are reserved for kvm internal use which are defined in
> @@ -110,6 +137,7 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region {
> */
> #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0)
> #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1)
> +#define KVM_MEM_PRIVATE (1UL << 2)
>
> /* for KVM_IRQ_LINE */
> struct kvm_irq_level {
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> index effdea5dd4f0..d605545d6dd1 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -89,3 +89,6 @@ config KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK
>
> config HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER
> bool
> +
> +config HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM
> + bool
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> index 7f0f5e9f2406..b882eb2c76a2 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> @@ -1532,7 +1532,7 @@ static void kvm_replace_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
> }
> }
>
> -static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
> +static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem)
> {
> u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
>
> @@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ static bool kvm_check_memslot_overlap(struct kvm_memslots *slots, int id,
> * Must be called holding kvm->slots_lock for write.
> */
> int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
> + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem)
> {
> struct kvm_memory_slot *old, *new;
> struct kvm_memslots *slots;
> @@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_set_memory_region);
>
> int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> - const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
> + const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem)
> {
> int r;
>
> @@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_memory_region);
>
> static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
> + struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem)
> {
> if ((u16)mem->slot >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS)
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -4698,6 +4698,33 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(struct kvm *kvm)
> return fd;
> }
>
> +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(field) \
> +do { \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \
> + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \
> + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region, field)); \
> +} while (0)
> +
> +#define SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(field) \
> +do { \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \
> + offsetof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct kvm_user_mem_region, field) != \
> + sizeof_field(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext, field)); \
> +} while (0)
> +
> +static void kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias(void)
> +{
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(slot);
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(flags);
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(guest_phys_addr);
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(memory_size);
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_FIELD(userspace_addr);
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_offset);
> + SANITY_CHECK_MEM_REGION_EXT_FIELD(restricted_fd);
> +}
> +
> static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
> unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> {
> @@ -4721,14 +4748,20 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
> break;
> }
> case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: {
> - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem;
> + struct kvm_user_mem_region mem;
> + unsigned long size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region);
> +
> + kvm_sanity_check_user_mem_region_alias();
>
> r = -EFAULT;
> - if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp,
> - sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem)))
> + if (copy_from_user(&mem, argp, size))
> + goto out;
> +
> + r = -EINVAL;
> + if (mem.flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE)
> goto out;
>
> - r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem);
> + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem);
> break;
> }
> case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {
> --
> 2.25.1
>