Re: [PATCH] io_uring: Fix a null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb()

From: Jens Axboe
Date: Tue Dec 06 2022 - 17:52:22 EST


On 12/6/22 2:30 PM, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 12/6/22 2:15?PM, Jens Axboe wrote:
>> On 12/6/22 2:38?AM, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
>>> Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows:
>>>
>>> BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>>> Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955
>>>
>>> CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75
>>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
>>> Call Trace:
>>> <TASK>
>>> dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
>>> ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>>> kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0
>>> ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>>> kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190
>>> io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>>> task_work_run+0x164/0x250
>>> ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
>>> get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440
>>> ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
>>> ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
>>> ? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0
>>> ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70
>>> ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230
>>> arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470
>>> ? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0
>>> ? putname+0xfe/0x140
>>> ? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10
>>> ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710
>>> ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
>>> ? putname+0xfe/0x140
>>> ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710
>>> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250
>>> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
>>> do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0
>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>>> RIP: 0023:0x0
>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>> RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b
>>> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
>>> RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
>>> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
>>> </TASK>
>>> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
>>>
>>> Add a NULL check on tctx to prevent this.
>>
>> I agree with Vegard that I don't think this is fixing the core of
>> the issue. I think what is happening here is that we don't run the
>> task_work in io_uring_cancel_generic() unconditionally, if we don't
>> need to in the loop above. But we do need to ensure we run it before
>> we clear current->io_uring.
>>
>> Do you have a reproducer? If so, can you try the below? I _think_
>> this is all we need. We can't be hitting the delayed fput path as
>> the task isn't exiting, and we're dealing with current here.
>
> While I think the above is the right description of what happens, I
> think there's still a race with the proposed solution. If the task_work
> gets added right after the newly inserted io_run_task_work(), then we'll
> still crash when the targeted task exits to userspace and runs the
> task_work.
>
> It should actually be fine to add that NULL check in io_tctx_exit_cb. We
> can't be racing here, as both the clear and io_tctx_exit_cb() are run by
> current itself. It's really just an ordering issue.

I've queued it up with an improved commit message, and also a code
comment:

https://git.kernel.dk/cgit/linux-block/commit/?h=for-6.2/io_uring-next&id=6d1b48314b989d059642958fc94ef0a58b25fc8c

--
Jens Axboe